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BRADY, ARKANSAS RULE 17.1, AND DISCLOSURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE AND EXPERT OPINION 
J. Thomas Sullivan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On the eve of a court-ordered deadline, defense attorneys for Jason 
Baldwin—one of three men convicted 15 years ago in the killing of three 
young boys in West Memphis—fired a new volley of allegations Thurs-
day in separate filings at the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Craighead 
County Circuit Court. 
In the Supreme Court filing, attorneys contend that prosecutors withheld 
material evidence from the defense teams representing Baldwin, then 16; 
Damien Echols, 18; and Jessie Misskelley, 17. 
In 2007, six forensic pathologists and odontologists hired by defense at-
torneys concluded that the three 8-year-old victims—Steve Branch, Mi-
chael Moore and Chris Byers—suffered injuries caused by animals prey-
ing on the boys’ bodies after death. 
Prosecutors had argued during Echols and Baldwin’s trial that the 
wounds were inflicted by a knife during satanic and sexual rituals. Those 
two were tried together; Misskelley was tried separately. 
In Thursday’s filing, defense attorneys say they recently learned that dur-
ing the murder investigation, West Memphis police consulted with San 
Diego police about the possibility that animal predation had caused the 
injuries. 
If the state considered animal predation a possible reason for the chil-
dren’s wounds, the state should have made that known to Baldwin’s trial 
attorneys, the defense’s court filing states.1 
  
 * Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. This article 
is based on remarks at the Altheimer Symposium at the UALR School of Law on April 18, 
2012, and is supported with a generous research grant by the UALR William H. Bowen 
School of Law. 
         1 Cathy Frye, Baldwin Lawyers File Salvo of Papers, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, May 
30, 2008, at B1. The next day the same reporter filed a second story, reporting that defense 
lawyers filed a post-conviction pleading alleging that the Craighead County Sheriff and a 
local school principal had both intimidated employees who would have testified in support of 
Baldwin, but who instead did not do so for fear of reprisals. Cathy Frye, Filing Contends 
Evidence Held Back in Killings, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, May 31, 2008, at B1. 
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The continuing—and recently concluded—story of perhaps the most 
notorious case in Arkansas history—the West Memphis Three murder case, 
popularly known as WM32––is one in which the protections afforded crimi-
nal defendants prove especially significant in ensuring not only the right of 
the accused to a fair trial, but also public confidence in the ability of the 
justice system to respond to the need for security against criminal activity.3 
In WM3, the need for both was heightened because of the horrible nature of 
the crimes—murder and apparent mutilation of the bodies of three young 
boys—and the sensational claims made that the crimes were related to Sa-
tanic cult activity.  
The ultimate disposition of the charges against Damien Echols, Jason 
Baldwin, and Jessie Misskelley will always prove unsatisfactory for many.  
The resolution of the case rests on  “Alford pleas”4 entered by the three de-
fendants. Their Alford pleas permitted them to plead guilty, while publically 
  
 2. Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996). During the trial, the State 
offered evidence that the motivation for the capital crime, the murder of a child, was related 
to Echols’s interest in the occult. Id. at 940, 954–60, 936 S.W.2d at 519, 527–31. Baldwin’s 
counsel consistently sought to distance his client from any evidence of involvement or shared 
interest in the occult. Id., 936 S.W.2d at 519, 527–29; see also Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 
449, 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996). The prosecution has drawn national attention, including two 
books and three documentaries. See generally MARA LEVERITT, DEVIL’S KNOT: THE TRUE 
STORY OF THE WEST MEMPHIS THREE (2002); GUY REEL, MARC PERRUSQUIA & 
BARTHOLOMEW SULLIVAN, BLOOD OF INNOCENTS: THE TRUE STORY OF MULTIPLE MURDER IN 
WEST MEMPHIS, ARKANSAS (1995); DEVIL’S KNOT: THE TRUE STORY OF THE WEST MEMPHIS 
THREE (Dimension Films 2013) (screenplay by Scott Derrickson and directed by Atom 
Egoyan; focusing on the issue of the teen defendants’ guilt and conduct of the prosecution 
and defense in the case); PARADISE LOST: THE CHILD MURDERS AT ROBIN HOOD HILLS (HBO 
1996) (Emmy award winning documentary directed and produced by Joe Berlinger and Bruce 
Sinofsky); PARADISE LOST 2: REVELATIONS (HBO 2001) (directed and produced by Joe Ber-
linger and Bruce Sinofsky). The Free the West Memphis Three website reported that 
5,342,300 visits had been made to the site at the time of the recent defense filings. 
EXONERATE THE WM3 OFFICIAL BLOG, http://www.wm3.org (last visited May 31, 2008). 
 3. See Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/us/20arkansas.html?pagewanted=all. “In keeping with 
the tenor of this case since its first horrific hours, the circumstances of the release were bi-
zarre, divisive and bewildering even to some of those who were directly involved.” Id. 
 4. The “Alford plea” is based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), in which the Court held that an accused’s protestation 
of his innocence of the offense for which he pleaded guilty in order to avoid possible imposi-
tion of a capital sentence would not provide a constitutionally-required basis for setting aside 
his conviction. The Court explained that an accused who is likely facing conviction and a 
death sentence, in light of a realistic view of the evidence available to the prosecution, might 
rationally opt to enter a plea guilty to avoid the possibility of execution while still believing 
in his or her own moral innocence. Id. at 37–38. The Court previously held in Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970), a federal prosecution, that the accused’s decision to 
plead guilty to avoid the possible imposition of a death sentence was not impermissibly com-
pelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
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maintaining their innocence, and obtain their immediate release from prison 
based on time served.5  
At the conclusion of the Alford plea process, the State announced that 
the guilt of the three defendants was certain for prosecutors; the defendants 
countered that they entered guilty pleas in order to end their incarceration, 
including Echols’s confinement on death row awaiting execution.6 While the 
process resulted in a formal resolution of the criminal charges, it will un-
doubtedly fail to conclusively establish responsibility for the horrible mur-
ders of the three children, suggesting that expediency was the key factor for 
the prosecution in closing the case.  
In a broader sense, of course, the apparently flawed investigation con-
ducted by police, dictating much in the conduct of the trial and lengthy post-
trial litigation, must be troubling to many in the legal and greater community 
who hold conflicting opinions as to the factual guilt of the three defendants.  
The West Memphis Three case illustrates the threat to the integrity of the 
criminal justice system when police or prosecutors fail to comply with con-
stitutional obligations designed to ensure fairness in the prosecution of indi-
viduals charged with criminal offenses.  
The failure of prosecutors to comply with duties to disclose evidence to 
the defense under federal constitutional protections and state procedural 
rules has proved a recurring problem for ensuring the integrity of convic-
tions obtained when the defense has not been fully advised prior to trial. The 
fact that prosecutorial misconduct claims have been substantiated in even 
the highest profile trials illustrates the strength of the temptation for prose-
cutors not to disclose evidence that might prove damaging to the prosecution 
  
 5. See, e.g., Mara Leveritt, The ‘Big Ask’, ARK. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2011, at 10, available 
at http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/the-big-ask/Content?oid=1888389 (reporting negotia-
tions leading to the entry of Alford pleas by the WM3 and their immediate release from cus-
tody). 
 6. It is unlikely that the resolution of the West Memphis murders with the Alford pleas 
negotiated with the three defendants will ever convince many that the actual killers of the 
three young boys will conclusively be identified. In March 2013, Pam Hicks, the mother of 
one victim filed an action for release of investigative reports relating to information identify-
ing four other individuals, including her ex-husband, as the actual killers of the children. Her 
action was joined with another parent’s action and was based on an affidavit given by an 
Arkansas prison inmate that prosecutors argued had been investigated and rejected by inves-
tigators during the initial investigation of the crimes in 1993. See Kenneth Heard, Filings in 
Lawsuit Claim Four Killed Three Boys in ‘93, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Mar. 28, 2013, at 
4B. Following a hearing on the parents’ claims, the circuit court dismissed the action, holding 
that the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act provides only for disclosure of documents—
not physical evidence—and rejecting the lawsuit as an attempt to collaterally attack the “con-
cluded criminal case.” The plaintiffs’ counsel announced that his clients would not appeal the 
circuit court’s ruling, explaining that they were “satisfied” that they knew “what happened in 
the woods.” See Kenneth Heard, Judge: Parents Can’t See ‘93 Evidence, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Apr. 4, 2013, at 5B. 
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at trial, or it illustrates the possibility for investigators to fail to disclose in-
formation obtained during the course of investigation to prosecuting attor-
neys who would otherwise faithfully comply with their disclosure duties. In 
such cases, there is often the greatest likelihood that discovery of suppressed 
evidence will ultimately expose the prosecution to public embarrassment 
and require that the defendants be afforded relief by way of new trial or 
dismissal. 
Perhaps the highest profile case in recent memory to inflict injury on 
the reputation of the prosecuting authority involves the tainted prosecution 
of the late United States Senator Ted Stevens. In Untied States v. Stevens, 
the Justice Department itself moved to vacate the Alaska Republican’s con-
viction for official misconduct based on suppression of evidence that would 
have impeached the testimony of its key witness at trial.7 The Stevens case 
is, regrettably, not the only incidence of misconduct in the suppression of 
evidence favorable to the accused in recent history. For instance, the United 
States Supreme Court granted relief in Smith v. Cain,8 a death penalty case9 
in which the court found that New Orleans prosecutors had failed to disclose 
prior inconsistent statements of a key witness. Specifically, the witness had 
once denied being able to identify Smith as the perpetrator. Similarly, in 
Green v. State, the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged prosecutorial 
misconduct in a failure to disclose the fact that its key witness in a capital 
murder prosecution had not only implicated his father in the quadruple mur-
der of an entire family as a result of a dispute over stolen marihuana plants, 
but also that he had given a statement implicating himself in the murders 
and exculpating his father.10 More recently, the federal prosecution of an 
  
 7. See United States v. Stevens, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (Senator Stevens’s 
conviction was set aside as a result of the trial court’s findings of discovery violations by the 
government); see also United States v. Stevens, 744 F. Supp. 2d 253, 256 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(referencing the court’s opinion in granting relief), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The 
Stevens court’s subsequent opinion focuses on the contempt citation imposed against the 
prosecutors in the case. Editorial, When Prosecutors Step over the Line, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 
2009, 4:34 PM, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/01/when-prosecutors-step-
over-the-line (discussing Attorney General Holder’s decision to move for trial court to set 
aside the verdict). 
 8. 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012). “No other witnesses and no physical evidence implicated 
Smith in the crime.” Id. at 629. 
 9. Smith was sentenced to life imprisonment on his conviction for five counts of mur-
der in a first trial. The case ultimately reversed by the United States Supreme Court. He was 
subsequently tried on another murder charge, convicted, and sentenced to death. His convic-
tion and sentence were upheld on direct appeal, with the prosecution relying on evidence 
from the first trial in its punishment case. Smith v. State, 793 So. 2d 1199, 1208 (La. 2001). 
The state courts stayed post-conviction proceedings pending disposition of Smith v. Cain. 
Brief for Petitioner at 10–12 & n.5, Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012) (No. 10-8145). 
 10. 365 Ark. 478, 231 S.W.3d 638 (2006). The convictions were reversed on other 
grounds and the defense sought to impose the bar of prior jeopardy to the retrial based on the 
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Arkansas attorney charged with Social Security fraud was terminated in the 
middle of trial based on the discovery that materials potentially favorable to 
the defense had not been disclosed by the government.11 
In light of the recurring failure of some prosecutors to disclose evi-
dence to the defense, the disclosure duty, especially in the context of scien-
tific evidence or expert opinion, is reexamined in this article. Part II of this 
article begins by outlining the duty to disclose under Brady v. Maryland12 
and then compares that duty to Rule 17.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The significance of scientific evidence in criminal cases is dis-
cussed in Part III, also highlighting egregious examples of such evidence 
being suppressed. Arkansas’s prosecutorial duty to disclose is explored in 
Part IV. Before concluding in Part VI, the problem of remedy for violating 
the duty to disclose is illustrated in Part V. 
II. THE DISCLOSURE DUTY 
The history of misconduct on the part of prosecuting attorneys in fail-
ing to disclose evidence to which the accused is entitled—in order to pre-
pare the defense at trial—indicates not only that the applicable rules are not 
universally followed, but also that the importance of understanding the op-
eration of the disclosure principles cannot be underestimated. The two basic 
sources of disclosure rules are the federal constitutional requirement for 
disclosure of exculpatory or favorable evidence as a matter of due process 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the operation of federal 
  
prosecutors’ failure to disclose the son’s exculpatory statement prior to trial. Id. The state 
supreme court rejected reliance on the proposed prior jeopardy remedy but referred the 
prosecuting attorneys to the Committee on Professional Conduct for investigation of the 
misconduct claim. Green v. State, 2011 Ark. 92, 380 S.W.3d 368. 
 11. See Letter Order, United States v. Easley, No. 4:10-CR-00240-BRW (E.D. Ark. 
Mar. 22, 2012), ECF No. 105 (granting the government's motion to dismiss); see also Motion 
to Dismiss, Easley, No. 4:10-CR-00240-BRW (E.D. Ark. Mar. 22, 2012), ECF No. 104 (gov-
ernment's motion to dismiss); Letter Order, Easley, No. 4:10-CR-00240-BRW (E.D. Ark. 
Mar. 22, 2012), ECF No. 103 (trial court's letter to government requesting explanation for 
disclosure failure); Email Communication from Defense Counsel to Trial Court, Easley, No. 
4:10-CR-00240-BRW (E.D. Ark. Mar. 22, 2012), ECF No. 102 (defense counsel's explana-
tion of failure of disclosure by government); Linda Satter, Charge Against Lawyer Dropped 
Midtrial After Agency Withheld Data, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Mar. 23, 2012,  available 
at http://iw.newsbank.com/iw-
search/we/InfoWeb?p_action=doc&p_theme=aggdocs&p_topdoc=1&p_docnum=1&p_sort=
YMD_date:D&p_product=NewsBank&p_docid=13DB2570DA577050&p_text_direct-
0=document_id=(%2013DB2570DA577050%20)&p_multi=ADGL&s_lang=en-
US&p_nbid=W55R4AHEMTM2ODc1NzY1Ny44MTk3NDI6MToxMToxNDQuMTY3LjA
uMA. 
 12. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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and state procedural rules often imposing broader disclosure duties on 
prosecuting attorneys. 
A. The Brady Principle Governing Discovery Rights in Criminal Cases 
The United States Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in Brady v. Mary-
land13 formalized a rule of disclosure that emerged from its prior decisions 
condemning the prosecution’s knowing reliance on perjured testimony in 
order to secure conviction14 and failure to correct false testimony offered by 
its witnesses at trial.15 Brady established the duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence to the defense, whether relevant to either the accused’s guilt or his 
culpability for purposes of sentencing.16 Moreover, Brady expressly rejected 
any requirement of proof that the prosecutor acted in bad faith or intention-
ally withheld evidence favorable to the accused in order to establish a due 
process violation based on the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.17 
And, perhaps most importantly, the Brady Court articulated the stan-
dard of proof required to demonstrate a due process violation warranting 
relief resulting from nondisclosure of evidence subject to the disclosure rule. 
The defendant is not required to show that he would have been acquitted or 
actually obtained a more favorable outcome had the exculpatory evidence 
been disclosed prior to trial, but only that there exists a reasonable probabil-
ity of a more favorable outcome. The Court recently reiterated this control-
ling principle in Smith v. Cain: “A reasonable probability does not mean that 
the defendant ‘would more likely than not have received a different verdict 
  
 13. Id.  
 14. The Court’s decisions in Napue, Pyle, and Mooney all arose in the context of use of 
perjured testimony in the prosecution’s case. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 265–67 (1959); 
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215–16 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112–13 
(1935). The Brady Court relied on these decisions and Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957), 
to affirm, as a general principle, the disclosure duty as a matter of due process. Brady, 373 
U.S. at 87.  
 15. Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 29–30. In Alcorta, defense counsel’s theory in the murder trial 
was that the defendant was guilty only of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter based 
on the theory that he killed while under the influence of "heat of passion." Id. The Court held 
prosecutor’s failure to correct witness’s denial that he had had sexual relationship with de-
fendant’s wife violated due process. Id. 
 16. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84–85. 
 17. Id. at 87. “We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favor-
able to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to 
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id.; see 
also Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004) (“We have held that when the State sup-
presses or fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence, the good or bad faith of the prose-
cution is irrelevant: a due process violation occurs whenever such evidence is withheld.”). 
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with the evidence,’ only that the likelihood of a different result is great 
enough to ‘undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the trial.’”18 
In a series of post-Brady decisions, the Court answered important ques-
tions about the parameters of the operation of the disclosure duty imposed as 
a matter of due process. It held that disclosure was required even when de-
fense counsel did not specifically move for disclosure in United States v. 
Agurs.19 In United States v. Bagley, the Court held that not only does the 
disclosure duty include exculpatory evidence, but also impeachment evi-
dence.20 And in Strickler v. Greene, the Court held that a prosecutor’s open 
file policy permitting defense counsel to inspect all evidence in the prosecu-
tor’s possession does not absolve the prosecutor of the disclosure duty when 
the file contains inaccuracies or significant omissions.21 
The Court subsequently offered a comprehensive discussion of the pa-
rameters of the disclosure duty in practice in Kyles v. Whitley, providing 
important answers to questions not specifically addressed in Brady.22 First, 
the Court explained that the disclosure duty was not limited to evidence 
actually in the possession of the prosecutor, but extended to all members of 
the prosecution team, including investigators involved in the case—
requiring the prosecutor to inquire the entire prosecution team about the 
existence of favorable evidence in its possession not previously forwarded 
to the prosecutor.23 This rule is particularly appropriate because it recognizes 
that failure of the police to forward evidence obtained during the investiga-
tion to the prosecuting attorney can result in a failure on the part of prosecu-
tors to comply with their duty to disclose. Law enforcement officers and 
investigators may otherwise sense that their suppression of favorable evi-
dence is preferable to disclosure to prosecutors who are duty-bound to then 
disclose the evidence to defense counsel. This creates an incentive for un-
ethical police to simply hide evidence as a means of preventing disclosures 
  
 18. 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)) . 
 19. 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 
 20. 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). 
 21. 527 U.S. 263, 276 & nn.13–14 (1999). 
 22. 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
 23. Id. at 437–38.  
 
[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known 
to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. 
But whether the prosecutor succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation, the 
prosecution's responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence ris-
ing to a material level of importance is inescapable. 
 
Id. Arkansas adopted this approach even before the Court’s decision in Kyles. Lewis v. State, 
286 Ark. 372, 691 S.W.2d 864 (1985); Williams v. State, 267 Ark. 527, 593 S.W.2d 8 
(1980). 
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that might assist the defense in avoiding conviction or arguing for leniency 
in sentencing. 
Second, Kyles established that multiple disclosure violations are to be 
considered cumulatively, rather than individually, in assessing whether dis-
covery violations by the prosecution meet the requirement for showing that 
there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome in the proceeding 
had the suppressed evidence been available to the defense—the Brady test 
for due process violation requiring relief.24 
In addition, Kyles affirmed that the test does not require proof that the 
disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have necessarily led to a differ-
ent result, involve a showing of insufficient evidence resulting from the 
nondisclosure,25 or require any additional harmless error analysis in assess-
ing a disclosure violation. Instead, once the Brady test for nondisclosure has 
been met, the due process violation requires relief.26 
Finally, Kyles affirmed that, as the leader of the “prosecution team,” 
the prosecutor bears the burden in determining whether evidence is favor-
able, and thus, subject to the disclosure requirement.27 Kyles makes clear 
that it is the prosecuting attorney’s obligation to make this determination, 
and in light of the Court’s reiteration of the Brady principle, it is clear that 
the Court assumed that the prosecutor must be trusted with this burden.28 
This allocation of the burden for decision-making presupposes, of 
course, that prosecutors will act ethically––perhaps a reasonable assumption 
for the Court to make, unless of course, the actual history of Brady litigation 
in the state and federal courts is considered. But even if the Court’s assump-
tion is reasonable, it presupposes that prosecutors—not necessarily experi-
enced in developing defensive theories for trial, nor fully informed of the 
facts upon which defense counsel’s strategic and tactical decisions will be 
based—are capable of correctly assessing what evidence is actually favor-
able to the accused. In many cases, it may be quite obvious, but in others, 
particularly cases in which a defense strategy is atypical or especially crea-
tive, the prosecutor may not be reasonably capable of making the decision 
regarding the exculpable nature of evidence. The Kyles court resolved this 
point by admonishing prosecutors: “This means, naturally, that a prosecutor 
anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece 
  
 24. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 460–61. 
 25. Id. at 434–35 & n.8. 
 26. Id. at 435 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). Under Chapman, 
constitutional error can be deemed harmless only if the error can be shown to be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. Proof of a Brady violation, however, 
requires the defendant to shoulder the burden of proving a reasonable probability of prejudice 
to the accused. 
 27. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38. 
 28. Id. at 439. 
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of evidence.”29 Whether the majority’s reliance on this bit of guidance is 
sufficient to ensure compliance with the mandate of the Brady/Kyles doc-
trine is questionable in light of the history of nondisclosure litigation. 
The Court’s consistent approach to disclosure recognizes that the de-
fense has a right to disclosure of all favorable evidence within the posses-
sion of the prosecutor or members of the prosecution team. And failure to 
disclose, regardless of the intent or good or bad faith on the part of the 
prosecution team, will require relief if the defendant can meet the burden of 
showing a reasonable probability that he or she has been prejudiced by the 
nondisclosure. But the continuing evidence of violations, as demonstrated 
by the Court’s recent decision in Smith v. Cain,30 raises questions about the 
reliance on the prosecution—at least in certain cases or offices31––to act 
ethically and intelligently in discharging the disclosure duty.  
B. Discovery Under the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 
There is no general right to discovery in criminal cases as a matter of 
federal constitutional protection.32 However, states and federal courts oper-
ate under rules that may expand discovery rights and disclosure duties that 
were adopted with a goal of expediting litigation or ensuring fairness to liti-
gants.33 This may prove particularly important with respect to discovery 
  
 29. Id.  
 30. 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012). 
 31. For instance, the track record of the Orleans Parish (Louisiana) District Attorney’s 
Office on Brady issues suggests an ongoing pattern of failure to comply with Brady. See 
generally Smith, 132 S. Ct. 627; Kyles, 514 U.S. 419; Monroe v. Butler, 485 U.S. 1024, 1028 
(1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Monroe v. Blackburn, 476 U.S. 1145, 1149–50 (1986) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Monroe v. Blackburn, 607 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1979); Davis v. Heyd, 
479 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1973); State v. Bright, 2002-2793 (La. 5/25/04); 875 So. 2d 37; State 
v. Cousin, 96-2973 (La. 4/14/98); 710 So. 2d 1065; State v. Marshall, 94-0461 (La. 9/5/95); 
660 So. 2d 819; State v. Knapper, 579 So. 2d 956 (La. 1991); State v. Rosiere, 488 So. 2d 
965 (La. 1986); State v. Evans, 463 So. 2d 673 (La. 1985); State v. Perkins, 423 So. 2d 1103 
(La. 1982); State v. Peters, 406 So. 2d 189 (La. 1981); State v. Curtis, 384 So. 2d 396 (La. 
1980); State v. Parker, 361 So. 2d 226 (La. 1978); State v. Falkins, 356 So. 2d 415 (La. 
1978); State v. Carney, 334 So. 2d 415 (La. 1976); State v. Lindsey, 2002-2363 (La. App. 4 
Cir. 4/2/03); 844 So. 2d 961; State v. Thompson, 2002-0361 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/17/02); 825 
So. 2d 552; State v. Lee, 2000-2429 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/4/01); 778 So. 2d 656; State v. Oliver, 
94-1642 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/9/96); 682 So. 2d 301; State v. Mims, 94-K-0333 (La. App. 4 
Cir. 5/26/94); 637 So. 2d 1253; State v. Dozier, 553 So. 2d 931 (La. Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
Felton, 522 So. 2d 626 (La. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Walter, 514 So. 2d 620 (La. Ct. App. 
1987); State v. Dawson, 490 So. 2d 560 (La. Ct. App. 1986).  
 32. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 546, 559 (1977). 
 33. The Commentary to Article V of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
relates to pretrial rules governing discovery, notes the following: 
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required relating to scientific evidence and expert opinion. In the federal 
system, for instance, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
authorizes reciprocal discovery of scientific test results and reports prepared 
by expert witnesses that the parties intend to use at trial.34 If the defendant 
requests disclosure, the government has the reciprocal right to obtain the 
same information relating to the experts or scientific evidence the defendant 
intends to call at trial.35 While disclosure in the federal system is contingent 
upon the defendant’s agreement to participate in the process by disclosing 
comparable information, the procedure under Arkansas rules is tactically 
more favorable for defendants. Arkansas Criminal Procedure Rule 
17.1(a)(iv), for instance, provides the following:   
  
Broad pretrial disclosure would seem to be not only desirable but also necessary. 
By encouraging guilty pleas, reducing delays during trial, and in general lending 
more finality to the disposition of criminal cases, disclosure alleviates docket 
congestion and permits a more economical use of resources. 
 
 34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(F)–(G). These sections provide the following: 
 
(F) Reports of Examinations and Tests. Upon a defendant's request, the govern-
ment must permit a defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph the results or 
reports of any physical or mental examination and of any scientific test or ex-
periment if: 
 
(i) the item is within the government's possession, custody, or control; 
 
(ii) the attorney for the government knows––or through due diligence could 
know––that the item exists; and 
 
(iii) the item is material to preparing the defense or the government intends to 
use the item in its case-in-chief at trial. 
 
(G) Expert witnesses.—At the defendant's request, the government must give to 
the defendant a written summary of any testimony that the government intends to 
use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its 
case-in-chief at trial. If the government requests discovery under subdivision 
(b)(1)(C)(ii) and the defendant complies, the government must, at the defendant's 
request, give to the defendant a written summary of testimony that the govern-
ment intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence as evidence at trial on the issue of the defendant's mental condition. The 
summary provided under this subparagraph must describe the witness's opinions, 
the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications. 
 
Id. 
 35. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16(b)(1)(B) and (C) require the defendant to 
supply comparable material to the government in the event the prosecution has first complied 
with the defendant’s discovery request. 
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(a) Subject to the provisions of Rules 17.5 and 19.4, the prosecuting at-
torney shall disclose to defense counsel, upon timely request, the follow-
ing material and information which is or may come within the posses-
sion, control, or knowledge of the prosecuting attorney: 
. . . . 
(iv) any reports or statements of experts, made in connection with the 
particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations, sci-
entific tests, experiments or comparisons . . . .36  
However, Arkansas does impose disclosure obligations on the defense 
that are not tied to reciprocal discovery. The defense is required, upon the 
State’s request, to disclose with specificity, information relating to the na-
ture of the defense that will be asserted at trial and identity of witnesses who 
will be called to testify for the defense.37 The applicable rule provides the 
following: 
Subject to constitutional limitations, the prosecuting attorney shall, upon 
request, be informed as soon as practicable before trial of the nature of 
any defense which defense counsel intends to use at trial and the names 
and addresses of persons whom defense counsel intends to call as wit-
nesses in support thereof. 38 
The failure of defense counsel to disclose the requested information 
may result in sanctions, including most importantly, exclusion of the wit-
ness’s testimony from trial.39  
  
      36.   ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(a)(iv). 
 37. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 18.3. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Neal v. State, 375 Ark. 389, 393–94, 291 S.W.3d 160, 163–64 (2009) (holding 
that exclusion of a witness whose identity was not disclosed until the jury had been seated did 
not constitute an abuse of discretion). The Neal court upheld the trial court’s action despite 
the fact that the witness was not known to defense counsel until after the jury had been se-
lected but before any testimony had been taken before the jurors immediately before trial. 
The State objected on the ground that jurors had not been questioned about whether they 
knew this witness. Id. at 393, 291 S.W.3d at 163. Although the State did not rely on Rule 
18.3 at trial to argue for exclusion of the witness, the court relied on the underlying principle 
of the rule and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Id. at 392, 291 S.W.3d at 
162. However, the court never discussed whether the exclusion of the witness would violate 
constitutional protections. See id. In the circumstances of this case, particularly in light of the 
opportunity for the prosecution to voir dire the witness prior to the trial court’s ruling, miti-
gating the chances of encountering surprise before the jury, it is not clear that excluding the 
witness did not intrude on the Sixth Amendment guarantee of compulsory process--the right 
to call witnesses and present a defense. Here, the trial court excluded the witness based in 
part on her lack of credibility, an admittedly impermissible basis for its action. Id. at 394, 291 
S.W.3d at 164. The only remaining basis for upholding the trial court’s action was the need to 
protect the State from unfairness in permitting the defense to call the witness without giving 
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Further, Rule 18.2 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure also 
expressly provides for required disclosure of defense experts, again subject 
to constitutional limitations and upon motion by the State:  
Subject to constitutional limitations, the trial court may require that the 
prosecuting attorney be informed of and permitted to inspect and copy or 
photograph any reports or statements of experts made in connection with 
the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations 
scientific tests, experiments or comparisons.40 
With respect to either disclosure requirement, the rules fail to explain 
the reference to the constitutional limitations that limit the duty imposed on 
defense counsel. Moreover, the Arkansas rules do not provide for reciprocal 
discovery and thus, apparently fail under the requirement imposed by the 
Court in Wardius v. Oregon41: the prosecution must be required to respond 
to compelled defense disclosures with disclosures of its rebuttal evidence as 
a matter of due process.42 
Rule 17.1 is broader in terms of discovery of scientific evidence or ex-
pert opinion than the disclosure duty required under Brady.43 It does not 
require that this type of evidence be exculpatory in order for the defendant 
to be entitled to its discovery.44 It also specifically addressed Brady con-
cerns, requiring disclosure consistent with constitutional requirements: 
(d) Subject to the provisions of Rule 19.4, the prosecuting attorney shall, 
promptly upon discovering the matter, disclose to defense counsel any 
material or information within his knowledge, possession, or control, 
which tends to negate the guilt of the defendant as to the offense charged 
or would tend to reduce the punishment therefor.45 
The rules also impose the duty on the prosecution to determine whether 
discoverable information is available through other members of the “prose-
cution team.”46 The reference to Rule 19.4 recognizes the restriction on im-
  
the state the opportunity to question jurors about their possible familiarity or knowledge of 
her beforehand. A less drastic procedure would have simply been for the trial court to advise 
the seated jury of the previously unidentified witness and then individually inquire any juror 
who might have personal knowledge of her, substituting an alternate in the event a juror 
disclosed any bias that would disqualify the juror from service. 
      40.   ARK. R. CRIM. P. 18.2. 
 41. 412 U.S. 470 (1973). 
 42. Id. at 475–76. 
 43. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1. 
 44. See id. 
 45. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(d). 
 46. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.3 provides the following: 
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mediate disclosure that may be imposed by a protective order entered by the 
circuit court. Moreover, Rule 17.2 requires the prosecutor to make the dis-
closures required by Rule 17.1 “as soon as practicable.”47 
With respect to discovery of scientific evidence, test results, or expert 
opinion reduced to written reports, the controlling Arkansas procedural rules 
afford defendants greater flexibility with respect to understanding the prose-
cution’s theory of the case and preparing the defense for trial. The Brady 
disclosure duty serves only to require the State to disclose evidence that is 
favorable to the defense. With respect to expert testimony, however, the 
more likely scenario for the defense involves the need to counter prosecu-
tion testimony with defense experts, assuming that there is a legitimate basis 
for disagreement as to the conclusions different experts reach. 
It is critically important that when the State’s theory rests on the results 
of scientific evidence or the opinion of expert witnesses, the defense be ap-
prised of exculpatory—or favorable—evidence, subject to disclosure under 
Brady. It is also critically important, in many cases, that the theory the 
prosecution will advance based upon unfavorable testimony is also disclosed 
so that it be countered. When possible, the defense may be able to counter 
  
(a) The prosecuting attorney shall use diligent, good faith efforts to obtain mate-
rial in the possession of other governmental personnel which would be discover-
able if in the possession or control of the prosecuting attorney, upon timely re-
quest and designation of material or information by defense counsel. 
 
(b) If the prosecuting attorney's efforts are unsuccessful, the court shall issue 
suitable subpoenas or orders to cause such material to be made available to de-
fense counsel where the material or other governmental personnel are subject to 
the jurisdiction of the court. 
 
 47. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.2(a). The rule also provides for alternative ways in which the 
disclosure may be made, authorizing, in pertinent part, 
 
(b) The prosecuting attorney may perform these obligations in any manner mutu-
ally agreeable to himself and defense counsel or by: 
 
(i) notifying defense counsel that material and information, described in general 
terms, may be inspected, obtained, tested, copied, recorded or photographed, dur-
ing specified reasonable times; or 
 
(ii) making available to defense counsel at a time specified such material and in-
formation, and suitable facilities and arrangements for inspection, testing, copy-
ing, recording or photographing of such material and information. 
 
(c) The prosecuting attorney may impose reasonable conditions, including an ap-
propriate stipulation concerning chain of custody, to protect physical evidence 
produced under this Article. 
 
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.2(b)–(c). 
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prosecution expert testimony with contrasting conclusions developed 
through defense experts or—and often more significantly—through skilled 
cross-examination that may serve to question the conclusions testified to by 
the State’s expert witnesses. Disclosure of the State’s case serves to permit 
defense counsel to seek other expert opinion, retesting of evidence, and edu-
cation with respect to the nature of the science relied upon by the prosecu-
tion expert that facilitates skillful cross-examination. 
One important point that arises in discovery issues under the Rules is 
that the State is not obligated to undertake any particular scientific testing or 
examination that might produce evidence favorable to the defense. In Thom-
erson v. State, the court confirmed that disclosure of such test results is re-
quired under Rule 17.1(a) but declined to hold that the prosecution is re-
quired to engage in any particular investigative technique that might pro-
duce exculpatory evidence.48 The court then admonished the defense:  
Appellant speculates here, however, that if tests had been made on vari-
ous tangible items, they might be exculpatory in nature. While this might 
be true, appellant has cited no authority imposing a duty on the state to 
make tests on all materials seized. A defendant in a criminal case cannot 
rely upon discovery as a total substitute for his own investigation.49 
The defense specifically sought disclosure of any items seized from the 
defendant that had been sent to the state crime lab for testing.50 However, no 
tests on the items were ever actually conducted, according to the record.51 
The court was thus able to conclude that the State had actually disclosed 
everything required by the Rule.52 
Thomerson demonstrates that while the scope of the Arkansas rule 
governing mandatory disclosures is broad, its application, in practice, is 
likely dependent on specific facts that may serve to excuse compliance. 
Conversely, Arkansas trial courts will be upheld on appeal for imposing 
even the extreme sanction of exclusion of evidence or witnesses when there 
is a technical noncompliance with the disclosure duty imposed on defense 
counsel by Rule 18.2.53 Disparity in treatment accorded to the prosecution 
and defense for discovery violations may suggest unfairness but may also 
reflect a suspicion that defendants can benefit from noncompliance that re-
sults in the State being sandbagged (surprised) at trial and unable to respond 
adequately to prevent an unwarranted acquittal barring retrial.  
  
 48. 274 Ark. 17, 19–20, 621 S.W.2d 690, 691–92 (1981). 
 49. Id. at 20, 621 S.W.2d at 692 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. at 19, 621 S.W.2d at 691. 
 51. Id., 621 S.W.2d at 691. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Neal v. State, 375 Ark. 389, 393–94, 291 S.W.3d 160, 163–64 (2009). 
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Finally, Rule 17.1(d) seemingly incorporates the Brady disclosure duty 
in the context of the prosecutor’s responsibilities under Rule 17.1.54 How-
ever, it imposes the Brady disclosure duty upon learning of favorable evi-
dence, providing “the prosecuting attorney shall, promptly [disclose] upon 
discovering the matter.”55 This formulation would presumably excuse dis-
closure violations when the favorable evidence was in the possession of 
investigators but had not been disclosed to the prosecutor. Because Brady, 
as explained in Kyles, treats investigators as members of the prosecuting 
team56 and imputes information known to them upon the prosecuting attor-
ney, subsection (d) fails to accurately instruct prosecutors as to the full ex-
tent of the their constitutional disclosure duty. 
III. THE DISCLOSURE DUTY: SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EXPERT OPINION 
Disclosure of scientific evidence or expert opinion favorable to the de-
fense is particularly significant in the criminal process precisely because 
such evidence often suggests a greater degree of reliability than eyewitness 
testimony,57 confessions,58 or testimony offered through witnesses having 
personal interests in the outcome of the litigation, such as jailhouse infor-
mants and accomplices59 whose testimony is often the product of induce-
  
 54. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(d). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
 57. Eyewitness identification testimony is considered so problematic that some courts 
have found that expert testimony concerning the common failures of human perception is 
admissible to challenge such identification in appropriate cases. See United States v. Brown-
lee, 454 F.3d 131, 141 (3d Cir. 2006). “It is widely accepted by courts, psychologists and 
commentators that ‘[t]he identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy.’” Id. (cita-
tions omitted). Other courts have concluded to the contrary—including the Eighth Circuit and 
Arkansas Court of Appeals––holding that the common experience of jurors was sufficient to 
permit them to fully appreciate the factors influencing the reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tion. See United States v. Martin, 393 F.3d 949, 953–54 (8th Cir. 2004); Caldwell v. State, 
267 Ark. 1053, 1059–61, 594 S.W.2d 24, 28–29 (Ark. App. 1980). 
 58. Confessions or inculpatory admissions, when made to police, are likely to prove 
particularly influential with jurors precisely because the accused’s statement essentially may 
serve to negate any inference of factual innocence. Yet, the admission itself may be the prod-
uct of improper influences or coercion, requiring that the defendant be permitted to offer 
evidence concerning the circumstances under which the statement was made in order to im-
peach its reliability. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986). 
 59. See, e.g., Dodd v. State, 784, 2000 OK 2, ¶ 25, 993 P.2d 778 (adopting mandatory 
procedure in state criminal trials for evaluating the credibility of testimony offered by in-
mates that relate admissions purportedly made by the accused while in custody). The Okla-
homa court, in a later case, explained the purpose of its approach in Dodd: 
 
The point of Dodd was to require more thorough examination of informant evi-
dence and complete and full disclosure of information relating to an informant's 
motivation to fabricate testimony. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its 
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ments designed to reward cooperation with the prosecution.60 The authority 
of scientific evidence and expert opinion is so important, and its public pro-
file so widespread—perhaps due to the recent proliferation of fact-based 
investigative documentaries and fictional television programs, such as CSI, 
CSI Miami, CSI New York, Crossing Jordan, Diagnosis Murder, and 
Quincy—that many prosecutors may now include questioning about juror 
expectations of scientific evidence during voir dire. This is possible in even 
routine prosecutions where the likelihood of application of sophisticated 
high-tech investigative techniques is neither warranted nor fiscally feasi-
ble.61 The power of both these investigative tools and public perceptions can 
hardly be underestimated. 
A. The Power of Scientific Evidence or Expert Opinion in the Fact-
Finding Process 
The strength of scientific evidence and expert opinion testimony often 
overpowers other forms of evidence typically offered in a criminal trial.62 
  
discretion by allowing the witness to testify. Any conflict or inconsistency in the 
witness's testimony goes to the weight and credibility of that testimony and are 
issues properly addressed on cross-examination. 
 
Myers v. State, 2006 OK 12, ¶ 14, 133 P.3d 312, 322. 
 60. The Supreme Court has consistently characterized accomplice testimony as inher-
ently suspect because of the motivation of accomplices to shift blame for their culpability and 
seek favorable treatment for their testimony. E.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 133–34, 
137 (1999); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1992); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 
135–36 (1968). Because of the potential for improper influence, including inducing witnesses 
to testify falsely to implicate the accused at trial, the Court has consistently held that prosecu-
tors must disclose to the defense any “deal” or benefit extended to the witness in exchange 
for testimony. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972); see also Windsor v. 
State, 338 Ark. 649, 653, 1 S.W.3d 20, 22–23 (1999) “It is routine in criminal prosecutions 
for the State to use accessories to testify under a plea bargain that promises a request for a 
reduced sentence.” Id., 1 S.W.3d 20, 22–23 (emphasis added). 
 61. See, e.g., AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Basic Trial Techniques for 
Prosecutors (2005), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/basic_trial_techniques_05.pdf. The 
trial techniques tell prosecutors about juror behavior: 
 
Jurors are inundated by crime-dramas in the popular media that create unrealistic 
expectations of police officers, prosecutors and judges. Many truly believe that 
crime scene investigators solve crimes in 60 minutes or less using high tech sci-
entific techniques. Obviously, this is not the case. Still, you should strive to meet 
the jurors’ expectations whenever possible.  
 
Id. at 5.  
 62. See Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It 
Should Not Be Amended, 138 FED. Rules Decisions 631, 632 (1991) (“Expert evidence can be 
both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this 
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This is perhaps most evident in the reliance on DNA evidence to establish 
the actual innocence of individuals convicted on the basis of eyewitness 
testimony or other nonscience based evidence. The Third Circuit observed 
this in United States v. Brownlee: 
The recent availability of post-conviction DNA tests demonstrate that 
there have been an overwhelming number of false convictions stemming 
from uninformed reliance on eyewitness misidentifications. In 209 out of 
328 cases (64%) of wrongful convictions identified by a recent exonera-
tion study, at least one eyewitness misidentified the defendant. In fact, 
“mistaken eyewitness identifications are responsible for more wrongful 
convictions than all other causes combined.” “[E]yewitness evidence 
presented from well-meaning and confident citizens is highly persuasive 
but, at the same time, is among the least reliable forms of evidence.”63 
Ironically, the exclusion of scientific testimony is often based on the 
same concern––its potential for overwhelming lay jurors, which could lead 
to verdicts based on unsubstantiated “science” or the improper use of scien-
tific evidence.64 This theme lies at the heart of the Supreme Court’s land-
mark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.65  
  
risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the 
present rules exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.”). 
 63. 454 F.3d 131, 141–42 (3d Cir. 2006) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) 
(citations omitted); see also Penny White, Newly Available, Not Newly Discovered, 2 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 7, 17–18 (2000) (arguing for broader authority for courts to consider DNA 
and other scientific evidence not available at trial). 
 
Appellate judges faced with the appeals of dismissals of late-filed motions for 
new trial based on newly available DNA evidence have an obligation to assess 
whether adherence to long-standing principles applicable to such motions is ap-
propriate when the evidence is not newly discovered in the traditional sense, but 
rather newly available as a result of recent technological advances. In those cases 
in which the evidence could actually exonerate a wrongfully convicted defen-
dant, strict time limitations should not impede the courts from accomplishing jus-
tice. 
 
Id.; see also Josephine Linker Hart & Guilford M. Dudley, Available Post-Trial Relief After a 
State Criminal Conviction When Newly Discovered Evidence Establishes “Actual Inno-
cence”, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 629 (2000) (arguing for an effective remedy for 
litigating claims of actual innocence based on newly available scientific evidence). 
 64. For example, in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 880–91 (1983), the Court sanc-
tioned reliance on the expert testimony of a forensic psychiatrist, forecasting the likelihood 
that a capital defendant would commit further acts of criminal violence in the future, a key 
finding required for imposition of a death sentence under Texas law. Justice Blackmun, in his 
dissent, took issue with the qualitative reliability of the opinion: 
 
The Court holds that psychiatric testimony about a defendant's future 
dangerousness is admissible, despite the fact that such testimony is wrong two 
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Moreover, flawed science and inaccurate expert opinion may prove to 
be strong tools for either the prosecution or the defense.66 For example, in 
  
times out of three. The Court reaches this result—even in a capital case—
because, it is said, the testimony is subject to cross-examination and impeach-
ment. In the present state of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for me. One 
may accept this in a routine lawsuit for money damages, but when a person's life 
is at stake—no matter how heinous his offense—a requirement of greater reli-
ability should prevail. In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, 
colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of 
a medical specialist's words, equates with death itself. 
 
Id. at 916 (Blackmun, Brennen, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 65. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The plaintiffs brought a products liability action alleging that 
birth defects suffered by children of mothers who had taken Bendectin, “a prescription an-
tinausea drug marketed by Merrell Dow,” were caused by the drug. Id. The Court reviewed 
the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the plaintiff’s expert opinion: 
 
The court emphasized that other Courts of Appeals considering the risks of Ben-
dectin had refused to admit reanalyses of epidemiological studies that had been 
neither published nor subjected to peer review. Those courts had found unpub-
lished reanalyses “particularly problematic in light of the massive weight of the 
original published studies supporting [respondent's] position, all of which had 
undergone full scrutiny from the scientific community.” Contending that 
reanalysis is generally accepted by the scientific community only when it is sub-
jected to verification and scrutiny by others in the field, the Court of Appeals re-
jected petitioners' reanalyses as “unpublished, not subjected to the normal peer 
review process and generated solely for use in litigation.” The court concluded 
that petitioners' evidence provided an insufficient foundation to allow admission 
of expert testimony that Bendectin caused their injuries and, accordingly, that pe-
titioners could not satisfy their burden of proving causation at trial. 
 
Id. at 584–85 (citations omitted). The Court then imposed a more comprehensive test for 
admission of expert testimony at trial, rejecting the exclusive reliance on the Frye test of 
general acceptability within the relevant scientific community that had traditionally been used 
in federal litigation. Id. at 585, 597–98. For an Arkansas decision discussing Daubert and 
admissibility of scientific evidence at trial, see Moore v. State, 323 Ark. 529, 543–48, 915 
S.W.2d 284, 293–95 (1996). 
      66. Similarly, improper use of scientific evidence can prejudice an accused in another 
way. In Davasher v. State, 308 Ark. 154, 823 S.W.2d 863 (1992), the accused asserted an 
insanity defense in a double murder case in which he was charged with murdering his ex-
girlfriend and her mother with a machete. The prosecution called a forensic odontologist who 
examined a dog bite sustained by the defendant and attempted to compare the bite pattern to 
the teeth of the victims’ pet dog, “Scooter.” Id. at 166–68, 823 S.W.2d at 870–71. The expert, 
who had compared the dog’s teeth to the wound, was unable to offer an opinion that Scooter 
had, in fact, bitten his owners’ killer; he was only able to say that the comparison did not 
exclude Scooter as the dog who inflicted the wound. Id. In short, this opinion had no proba-
tive value at all, yet the supreme court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in 
permitting the jury to hear this testimony. Id. at 167–68, 823 S.W.2d at 870–71. The majority 
concluded that the expert testimony met the test for admissibility because “[t]he evidence was 
helpful in determining whether it could have occurred. The fact that Dr. Glass could not 
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the Texas case of Willingham v. State, Texas executed Cameron Willingham 
on the basis of expert testimony that the fire that destroyed his home and 
killed his wife and children was caused by arson.67 At trial, the prosecution’s 
expert witness testified that Willingham had committed arson, which re-
sulted in the death of his children.68 A Chicago Tribune investigation re-
sulted in a scientific disagreement with this expert’s opinion. The Tribune 
reported that the expert testimony supporting the conviction had been re-
viewed by four arson experts consulted by the newspaper; their conclusions 
confirmed that the original investigation was flawed, and the fire was possi-
bly even accidental.69 However, Texas courts and the governor refused to act 
on a report from a “prominent fire scientist questioning the conviction,” 
permitting Willingham’s execution to proceed.70 According to the Tribune, 
Even Edward Cheever, one of the state deputy fire marshals who had as-
sisted in the original investigation of the 1991 fire, acknowledged that 
[the report of the experts consulted by the newspaper] was valid. “At the 
time of the Corsicana fire, we were still testifying to things that aren’t 
accurate today,” [Cheever] said. “They were true then, but they aren’t 
now. . . . We know now not to make those same assumptions.”71 
  
positively state that Scooter bit Davasher goes only to the weight of the evidence, not its 
admissibility.” Id. at 168; 823 S.W.2d at 871. The fact that the defendant had suffered a bite 
was a physical fact, but the odontologist’s testimony merely offered jurors a basis for specu-
lating that Scooter had inflicted the bite in an effort to defend his owners. It is nearly certain 
that the majority was swayed by passion when reviewing the case, as suggested by its recita-
tion of the facts surrounding the discovery of the bodies of the two victims in the case: “After 
searching the rooms, [Officer Hoover] went to the back door and saw the bodies of Hamilton 
and Hignight lying side by side in the back yard. He further observed severe cut wounds on 
the victims' heads and bodies. The family dog, Scooter, was found between the bodies, whim-
pering.” Id. at 158, 823 S.W.2d at 868 (emphasis added). While the picture painted by the 
majority is undoubtedly heart-rending, this appeal to the readers’ emotions—and at trial, the 
jurors’—simply serves to incite passion in an effort to support the majority’s conclusion—
that despite uncontroverted testimony offered by forensic experts from the Arkansas State 
Hospital that the defendant was insane, his conviction was rational. See id. at 172, 823 
S.W.2d at 873 (Brown, J., dissenting) (“Over the years the insanity defense has been whittled 
away until, with this case, virtually nothing is left.”). 
 67. Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 354–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).  
 68. Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Man Executed on Disproved Forensics, CHI. TRIB., 
Dec. 9, 2004, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/na/chi-
0412090169dec09,0,7244555.story. 
 69. Id. The Tribune noted that the National Fire Protection Association’s NFPA 921 was 
initially published in February, 1992—less than two months after the fire at the Willingham 
residence. Id. Contributors to this standard work advised the Tribune in its investigation of 
the Willingham case. Id. For information on the new edition of NFPA 921, see Dennis W. 
Smith, NFPA 921 Overview, NAT’L FIRE PROTECTION ASS’N J. (2008). 
 70. Mills & Possley, supra note 68.  
 71. Id. One of those assumptions made by expert witnesses testifying at Willingham’s 
trial involved “crazed glass”: 
 
264 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
Thus, the expert testimony relied upon to convict Willingham was later 
shown to have been wrong, as it was based on the testifying expert’s incor-
rect assumption that the burn pattern proved that an accelerant had been 
used to start the fire, which was consistent with arson.72 
Willingham represents the danger inherent in reliance on expert opinion 
based on faulty or incomplete science.73 Later, new expert evidence repudi-
ating the testimony supporting Willingham’s conviction served to exonerate 
another Texas death row inmate, Ernest Willis.74 Willis was also convicted 
on testimony that a house fire, which caused the victim’s death, was the 
result of arson.75 His conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct 
appeal by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which rejected his chal-
lenge that the evidence was insufficient.76 Later, at the state court post-
conviction hearing on Willis’s claims, expert testimony on the origin of the 
fire contradicted the prosecution’s expert testimony presented at trial; but, 
the state court denied relief.77 In the federal habeas corpus process, however, 
  
 
[T]he intricate, weblike cracks through glass. For years arson investigators be-
lieved it was a clear indication that an accelerant had been used to fuel a fire that 
became exceedingly hot. Now, analysts have established that it is created when 
hot glass is sprayed with water, as when the fire is put out. It was just such evi-
dence that helped convict Willingham. 
 
Id. Similarly, the Tribune continued, "Just as . . . consultants dismissed the “crazed glass,” 
they also said other so-called indicators—floor burn patterns and the charring of wood under 
the aluminum threshold—were just as unreliable.” Id. The experts said evidence indicated the 
fire advanced to flashover, a phenomenon that occurs when a fire gets so hot that gas builds 
up and causes an explosion. After flashover, “it becomes impossible to visually identify ac-
celerant patterns.” Id. Finally, the story quoted the lead investigator as disagreeing with trial 
testimony that charring of the wood was attributable to an accelerant under the threshold. The 
investigator stated that that “is clearly impossible. Liquid accelerants can no more burn under 
an aluminum threshold than grease can burn in a skillet, even with a loose-fitting lid.” Id. 
 72. Id. For a compelling perspective on the Willingham case, see David Grann, Trial by 
Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann. 
 73. Willingham was executed on February 17, 2004. Executed but Possibly Innocent, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executed-possibly-innocent 
(last visited June 26, 2008). 
      74.  Willis v. Cockrell, No. P-01-CA-20, 2004 WL 1812698, at *35 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 
2004). The federal habeas court granted relief on multiple claims, including ineffective assis-
tance in both the guilt/innocence and punishment phases of trial; suppression of favorable 
evidence on the issue of punishment by the prosecution; and improper administration of 
antipsychotic medication during trial. Id. Almost incredibly, the evidence developed in the 
federal habeas proceeding included a confession to the offense, corroborated on some poten-
tially important points by another death row inmate who was subsequently executed on his 
unrelated crime. Id. at *8–10. 
      75.   See Willis v. State, 785 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc). 
 76. Id. at 382. 
 77. Cockrell, 2004 WL 1812698, at *10. 
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the district court granted relief that relied on the new expert evidence and 
noted that other evidence was consistent with Willis’s version of the fire, 
including the absence of evidence of any accelerant on the clothes he was 
wearing on that night examined by the state crime lab.78 
Once the case returned to the trial court, the prosecutor consulted 
sources used by the Chicago Tribune in its investigation in Willingham’s 
case. When the same experts rejected the prosecution’s theory of the cause 
of the fire, the Pecos County (Texas) District Attorney dropped the charges, 
citing the convincing conclusions that led the experts to exclude arson as a 
theory for the homicide.79  
The power of incorrect expert opinion to influence jurors to convict is 
apparent. But, the power of scientifically sound expert opinion also offers 
the prospect that wrongful convictions will be averted.80 And, when science 
offers newly available evidence that may unravel convictions that were ob-
tained with evidence subsequently disproved by the scientific advance, there 
is a necessarily complex public response to a system that has erred. Exon-
erations may fuel lack of confidence in the fairness or integrity of convic-
tions, particularly when jury verdicts have been reviewed by multiple layers 
of state and federal courts. Conversely, the exonerations also demonstrate 
that the criminal justice system does have the capacity to recognize and cor-
rect errors resulting in wrongful convictions, particularly when the correc-
tion is attributable to scientific advances. Even in capital cases, the system 
offers a process for correcting errors, although exoneration after execution is 
the most troubling problem for the criminal justice system.   
 The Arkansas General Assembly has recognized the need to provide a 
remedy for defendants able to offer newly discovered or newly available 
scientific evidence that would establish their actual innocence of the of-
fenses for which they have been convicted. The legislature adopted a provi-
sion creating a new post-conviction remedy for litigation of these types of 
claims: 
(a) Except when direct appeal is available, a person convicted of a crime 
may commence a proceeding to secure relief by filing a petition in the 
court in which the conviction was entered to vacate and set aside the 
judgment and to discharge the petitioner or to resentence the petitioner or 
  
 78. Id. 
 79. Mills & Possley, supra note 68. The Tribune reporters also noted that out of a total 
of 944 inmates executed, only Willingham has been executed for an arson-based capital 
murder since the Supreme Court upheld state death penalty statutes following its 1972 deci-
sion in Furman. See id.  
 80. See, e.g., EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY 
SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER 
TRIAL (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf (presenting case stud-
ies of convicted individuals exonerated by newly-available DNA evidence).  
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grant a new trial or correct the sentence or make other disposition as may 
be appropriate, if the person claims under penalty of perjury that: 
(1) Scientific evidence not available at trial establishes the petitioner's 
actual innocence; or 
(2) The scientific predicate for the claim could not have been previously 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence and the facts underlying 
the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, 
would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no 
reasonable fact-finder would find the petitioner guilty of the underlying 
offense. 
(b) Nothing contained in this subchapter shall prevent the Arkansas Su-
preme Court or the Arkansas Court of Appeals, upon application by a 
party, from granting a stay of an appeal to allow an application to the 
trial court for an evidentiary hearing under this subchapter.81 
The Arkansas habeas remedy provided the basis for the final round of 
litigation pursued by the WM3 defendants and, perhaps, led the State to 
agree to the resolution by entry of the Alford pleas, resulting in termination 
of the proceedings prior to the hearing scheduled on their petitions.82 In re-
manding the cause, the Arkansas Supreme Court explained the significance 
of the DNA test results: 
The results of the testing established that neither Echols, Baldwin, nor 
Misskelley was the source of any of the biological material tested, which 
included a foreign allele from a penile swab of victim Steven Branch; a 
  
 81. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-201 to -208 (LEXIS Repl. 2006). The statute is strictly 
construed with respect to the requirement that the testing be sufficient to prove the convicted 
defendant’s actual innocence of the crime for which he or she has been convicted. See Till-
man v. State, No. CR 05-624, 2006 WL 1516414 (Ark. June 1, 2006) (citing Graham v. State, 
358 Ark. 296, 188 S.W.3d 893 (2004)) (holding that where defendant pleads guilty and ad-
mitted he was the person charged, habeas relief is unavailable because he cannot make a 
prima facie showing that identity was an issue at trial if he contends that post-trial scientific 
testing will prove his actual innocence). 
 82. The Arkansas Supreme Court remanded the case for evidentiary hearing on the 
DNA/actual innocence motion in Echols v. State, 2010 Ark. 417, 373 S.W.3d 892, after re-
viewing the recent history in the case.  
 
In 2002, while his other petitions for postconviction relief were pending, Echols 
filed a motion in the circuit court for DNA testing under Arkansas Code Anno-
tated section 16–112–202 (Supp. 2001). The circuit court entered a testing order 
on June 2, 2004, after the parties agreed to the terms of the order. On February 
23, 2005, an amended order for DNA testing was entered. The DNA testing was 
conducted between December 2005, and September 2007. 
 
Id. at 3, 373 S.W.3d at 895–96 (footnote omitted). 
2013] DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE 267 
hair from the ligature used to bind victim Michael Moore; and a hair re-
covered from a tree stump, near where the bodies were recovered. In ad-
dition, the DNA material from the hair found in the ligature used to bind 
Moore was found to be consistent with Terry Hobbs, Branch's stepfather. 
The hair found on the tree stump was consistent with the DNA of David 
Jacoby, a friend of Terry Hobbs.83 
While the DNA results did not necessarily exculpate the WM3 defen-
dants, the testing certainly suggested that other individuals were either re-
sponsible for the murders or involved to some extent—a theory wholly in-
consistent with the prosecution’s theory at trial. The DNA results likely in-
creased pressure on the prosecution to recognize that if the defendants pre-
vailed at the hearing, it would have been difficult to retry the case. Thus, the 
disposition by Alford pleas was acceptable and preferable to a retrial that 
could have resulted in their acquittals. 
B. Suppression of Scientific Evidence or Expert Opinion: Horror Stories 
In a highly-publicized Illinois capital murder case, co-defendants 
Rolando Cruz84 and Alejandro Hernandez85 were convicted and sentenced to 
death for the murder, kidnapping, and rape of ten-year-old Jeanine Nicarico 
during the burglary of her home in DuPage County in 1983. Their convic-
tions were initially reversed based on improper admission of hearsay relat-
ing to their purported inculpatory statements.86 They were eventually freed 
based on another individual’s confession of his commission of the capital 
crime.87 
A third individual, Stephen Buckley, was also charged with capital 
murder and tried in a separate trial. After the state prosecuting attorney dis-
missed the criminal charges against Buckley, the Supreme Court recounted 
the proceedings again in Buckley’s civil rights action in Buckley v. Fitzsim-
mons.88 At Buckley’s criminal trial, the prosecution called an expert who 
testified that a boot print discovered on the front door of the victim’s fam-
ily’s home not only matched Buckley’s boot, but that it had definitely been 
made by Buckley during his forced entry into the home.89 Buckley’s capital 
  
 83. Id., 373 S.W.3d at 895–96. 
 84. People v. Cruz, 521 N.E.2d 18, 19 (Ill. 1988). 
 85. People v. Hernandez, 521 N.E.2d 25, 26 (Ill. 1988). 
 86. Cruz, 521 N.E.2d at 22–23; Hernandez, 521 N.E.2d at 35–37. 
 87. People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 664 (Ill. 1994). The Cruz case was the subject of a 
true crime television documentary. See generally American Justice: Presumed Guilty (A&E 
television broadcast May 21, 1997). This movie can be viewed at 
http://movies.nytimes.com/movie/245535/American-Justice-Presumed-Guilty/overview. 
 88. 509 U.S. 259, 263 (1993). 
 89. Id. at 262. 
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murder trial ended in a mistrial due to the inability of jurors to reach a 
unanimous verdict.90 The expert died following the mistrial, leading the 
prosecutors to dismiss their case against Buckley, while making public an-
nouncements affirming their belief in his involvement in the murder and 
guilt.91 
Buckley subsequently sued the prosecutors and investigators in the 
case, alleging prosecutors committed misconduct when they deliberately 
disregarded and suppressed expert opinion that the bootprint could not relia-
bly be matched to his boots.92 Further, Buckley claimed that prosecutors had 
deliberately employed an unreliable expert known to offer opinion and con-
clusions favorable to prosecutors.93 The majority summarized Buckley’s 
claim that prosecutors had acted egregiously in building their case, particu-
larly the expert testimony regarding the bootprint: 
The fabricated evidence related to a bootprint on the door of the Nicarico 
home apparently left by the killer when he kicked in the door. After three 
separate studies by experts from the Du Page County Crime Lab, the Il-
linois Department of Law Enforcement, and the Kansas Bureau of Iden-
tification, all of whom were unable to make a reliable connection be-
tween the print and a pair of boots that petitioner had voluntarily sup-
plied, respondents obtained a “positive identification” from one Louise 
Robbins, an anthropologist in North Carolina who was allegedly well 
known for her willingness to fabricate unreliable expert testimony. Her 
opinion was obtained during the early stages of the investigation, which 
was being conducted under the joint supervision and direction of the 
sheriff and respondent Fitzsimmons, whose police officers and assistant 
prosecutors were performing essentially the same investigatory func-
tion.94 
The Buckley Court explained that while prosecutors are not always 
shielded from civil liability by the doctrine of absolute immunity, such as 
when they are advising police in the investigation of criminal activity, they 
were, nonetheless, not necessarily liable for all possible misconduct and 
virtually always remain shielded by the less comprehensive protection af-
forded by the doctrine of qualified immunity.95 On remand, the Seventh Cir-
  
 90. Id. at 264. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 261–62. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 262–63. 
 95. Id. at 271–72. While prosecutors are absolutely immune from actions undertaken 
while performing their duties in the actual prosecution of a criminal case, they do not enjoy 
this level of immunity when involved in investigation prior to the charging of a defendant. Id. 
at 272–73. When assisting other law enforcement agents in the investigation process, they are 
only entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 273. “Under this form of immunity, government 
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cuit, considering the prosecutor’s tactics in securing the testimony of an 
unreliable expert to testify against the co-defendants, concluded that the 
tactic did not amount to a violation of constitutional rights outside the quali-
fied immunity protection enjoyed by public officials.96 Instead, the circuit 
court observed, “Neither shopping for a favorable witness nor hiring a prac-
titioner of junk science is actionable, although it may lead to devastating 
cross-examination if the judge permits the witness to testify.”97 
The Seventh Circuit in the Nicarico murder case recognized that the 
prosecutors’ rejection of other expert opinions in favor of an expert whose 
questionable conclusions placed Buckley at the scene of the crime with Cruz 
and Hernandez may have ethical implications. Despite this, prosecutors 
were still protected from civil liability by application of the “absolute im-
munity” doctrine.98 For defense counsel, the litigation demonstrates the dan-
ger in assuming that expert testimony offered by the State at trial is the only 
opinion offered by experts contacted by prosecutors during case preparation. 
In fact, other experts consulted by the State may disagree with those eventu-
ally called by the prosecution to testify at trial, experts whose conflicting 
opinions might provide a strong basis for impeachment or rebuttal for the 
defense.  
The Buckley prosecution demonstrates the strategic importance of sci-
entific or forensic evidence at trial, particularly when the case rests in whole 
or in part on circumstantial evidence relating to the facts of the offense 
charged. It also demonstrates the threat to the fairness of trial if a prosecutor 
suppresses expert opinion helpful to the defense or engages in direct or indi-
rect fabrication of evidence it plans to offer at trial. This is particularly true 
with respect to scientific evidence because it often tends to overwhelm lay 
witness testimony. This leads to conflicting juror views because of the ques-
tionable credibility and reliability of the witness.99 
  
officials are not subject to damages liability for the performance of their discretionary func-
tions when ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Id. at 268 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 96. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 796–97 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 97. Id. at 796. The circuit court noted, as well, that there was disagreement among courts 
concerning the reliability of the expert, Robbins. Id. at 796 n.1. 
 98. See id. at 796–97. 
 99. In an interesting contrast to the reliance on expert testimony in Buckley regarding the 
bootprint recovered from the scene of the murder, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a trial 
court’s admission of an officer’s testimony regarding comparison of the shoeprint found at 
the crime scene of a capital murder and the accused’s shoes in Moore v. State, 323 Ark. 529, 
548–50, 915 S.W.2d 284, 295. The officer testified that he was not an expert on such prints 
but was permitted to offer lay opinion regarding the shoe’s sole pattern. Id., 915 S.W.2d at 
295. 
270 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
Another example of prosecutorial misconduct is illustrated by the liti-
gation history in Connick v. Thompson, a § 1983 action in which the Su-
preme Court vacated a fourteen million dollar jury verdict.100 The Court’s 
reasoning in vacating the jury award demonstrates the difficulty in circum-
venting the application of the doctrine of absolute immunity. The difficulty 
emerged from the argument that the prosecutors were negligently trained or 
supervised. Because the deputy actually committing the disclosure violation 
could not be held directly liable due to the shield of absolute immunity, the 
plaintiff was forced to argue that the violation resulted from negligence in 
the administration of the prosecutor’s office. The plaintiff argued that the 
training and supervision of deputies were not subject to absolute immunity 
because they did not arise directly in the course of the prosecutors’ function 
in the course of prosecuting the individual criminal case.101 Thompson had 
been convicted of robbery in New Orleans in which a deputy prosecutor 
deliberately suppressed blood-type evidence that would have excluded him 
as a suspect in the crime.102 Thereafter, when charged with murder, he 
elected not to testify on his own behalf at trial because of the availability of 
the robbery conviction to the prosecution to impeach his trial testimony.103 
He was convicted and spent fourteen years on death row before being exon-
erated when an investigator discovered the report of the suppressed blood-
type evidence from the preceding prosecution.104 Upon being diagnosed with 
terminal cancer, the culpable deputy had confessed to another deputy prose-
cutor that he had hidden the exculpatory evidence.105   
Thompson was afforded relief on the capital conviction and, upon re-
trial, he testified and was acquitted.106 He then filed his civil rights action, 
arguing that the failure to disclose the exonerating blood-type evidence was 
the result of negligence on the part of the prosecutor’s office. He claimed 
that the office failed to properly train their deputy prosecutors about the 
proper scope of the Brady disclosure duty. The Court, in a five-to-four deci-
sion, concluded that a single act of misconduct or negligence was insuffi-
cient to establish the pattern of violations necessary to demonstrate a policy 
on the part of local officials reflecting deliberate indifference to individual 
rights amounting to a deprivation.107 Because Thompson relied on the sup-
  
 100. 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1355–56 (2011). 
 101. Id. at 1356. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. The deputy who received the confession, but took no action to disclose the violation, 
was subsequently disciplined. In re Riehlmann, 2004–0680 (La. 1/19/05); 891 So. 2d 1239. 
 106. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1357. 
 107. Id. at 1359 (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 
(1978)) (“Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under § 1983 must 
prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.”). 
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pression of the blood-type evidence to show that the prosecutor’s office 
should have essentially anticipated that deputies would need training with 
respect to their Brady disclosure duty, suppression of the blood-type report 
should have been addressed with proper training, and the prosecutor was 
liable for his fourteen-year stint on death row. 
In the recent high profile and extensively covered capital murder of 
Casey Anthony, the state of Florida relied on the conclusions of an expert 
software designer. This expert’s data reportedly showed that Anthony con-
ducted eighty-four computer searches of the word “chloroform.” The prose-
cutors later used this opinion at trial as evidence of her intent to kill her 
daughter, Caylee.108 After her acquittal, the prosecution’s expert disclosed to 
the media that he had reformulated the program used to track Anthony’s 
computer activity and that the revised evaluation of the data showed that, in 
fact, she had only searched for “chloroform” a single time.109 Although the 
software designer reported the discrepancy to the prosecutors and an inves-
tigator, the revised conclusions were never reported to the jury during the 
trial.110 
These anecdotes illustrate the potential for corruption of the trial proc-
ess. Failing to disclose favorable evidence required by Brady and its prog-
eny could lead to jurors to rely on the false impressions created by the 
prosecution’s pert witnesses—this is true even in the most serious cases 
involving capital sentences and execution. 
With respect to the WM3 prosecution, the claim that investigators 
failed to disclose their consultations with San Diego police concerning ani-
mal predation as an explanation for the mutilated bodies of the three victims 
also highlights potential weakness in the enforcement of the Brady duty. 
Both the U.S. Constitution and Arkansas’s procedural rules that govern the 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence presumably ensure a fair trial. Although 
  
 108. See Lizette Alvarez, Software Designer Reports Error in Anthony Trial, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 19, 2011, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/19/us/19casey.html. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 
A former Canadian police sergeant who specializes in computer forensic analy-
sis, Mr. Bradley said he first became suspicious of the data after he testified on 
June 8. He said he had been called to testify by the prosecution about his Cache-
Back software. Instead, he was asked repeatedly about the Sheriff’s Office report 
detailing the 84 search hits on “chloroform,” which he had not seen. “I had trans-
lated the data into something meaningful for the police,” he said. “Then I turned 
it over to them. The No. 1 principle for them is to validate the data, and they had 
the tools and resources to do it. They chose not to.”  
 
Id. The post-trial revelation that the revised conclusions had not been disclosed to the defense 
led to one of Anthony’s trial attorneys terming the prosecution’s nondisclosure “outrageous.” 
Id. 
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there was evidence that the police considered the victims’ wounds were pos-
sibly caused by animal predation, that fact alone might not constitute excul-
patory evidence or subject matter likely to lead to exculpatory evidence. 
However, if the police had obtained an expert opinion that animal predation 
was a cause consistent with the additional evidence, that opinion should 
have been disclosed because it would have created a doubt not otherwise 
raised by evidence adduced at trial. Or, if an officer denied under oath hav-
ing explored the possibility of animal predation on cross-examination, the 
prosecutor would have been obligated to correct the false impression created 
by the denial.111 
In WM3 co-defendant Misskelley’s case, the evidence might have been 
corroborated by expert opinion he offered in support of his motion for new 
trial.112 A forensic pathologist in the state medical examiner’s office testified 
at the hearing on the new trial motion that the type of cuts suffered by the 
victims likely required “some skill and precision.”113 This suggests that the 
cuts would unlikely have been made by the teenage defendants and poses a 
reasonable alternative theory of the crime. The Misskelley defense, how-
ever, did not have Dr. Peretti’s opinion available at his trial; the fact became 
known when he testified later at the Echols/Baldwin joint trial.114 The mo-
tion for new trial was denied, and the trial court’s ruling was upheld on ap-
peal. The supreme court concluded that the newly discovered evidence, 
which included the pathologist’s revised time of death, would have been 
insufficient to change the outcome of the proceedings.115 Subsequently, the 
supreme court rejected Baldwin and Misskelley’s motions for leave to file 
coram nobis petitions.116 The eventual disposition of the WM3 charges ren-
dered the three defendants’ procedural hurdles moot. 
  
 111. See Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 
87 (1963) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)) (“The same result obtains 
when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it 
appears.”). 
 112. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 478, 915 S.W.2d 702, 717 (1996). 
 113. Id., 915 S.W.2d at 717. 
 114. Id., 915 S.W.2d at 717. 
 115. Id. at 478–79, 915 S.W.2d at 717–18.  
 116. Formal Order, Baldwin v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996) (No. CR94-
928), available at http://callahan.8k.com/pdf/jb_habeas_rule37/11_formal_order.pdf (June 
26, 2008 order denying, without prejudice, Baldwin’s petition to proceed in the trial court 
with a writ of error coram nobis); Formal Order, Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 
S.W.2d 702 (1996) (No. CR94-848) (June 5, 2008, order denying without prejudice 
Baldwin’s petition to proceed in the trial court with a writ of error coram nobis). 
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IV. DISCLOSURE IN ARKANSAS 
Arkansas courts treatment of discovery violations appear inconsistent 
but rather promising. The Arkansas Supreme Court has shown assertiveness 
in moving to remedy Brady violations.117 This assertiveness was, perhaps, 
sparked, to some degree, by the WM3’s long struggle in post-conviction 
litigation in which they sought to obtain relief from the sentences imposed 
following their 1994 convictions. The court has, for instance, clarified that 
the only procedural remedy available for challenging disclosure failures 
discovered following the trial and direct appeal process is by petition for 
writ of error coram nobis,118 finally rejecting any reliance on Rule 37 pro-
ceedings as means for raising these claims.119 The coram nobis remedy will 
actually prove far more favorable for many defendants than Rule 37 be-
cause, thus far, the court has imposed less onerous restrictions in pleading 
and, more importantly, due diligence, rather than the strict limitations period 
imposed by Rule 37.2, is the standard for timely assertion of a claim.120 
  
 117. E.g., Buckley v. State, 2010 Ark. 154, at 6–7, 2010 WL 1255763 (granting leave to 
file petition for writ of error coram nobis in circuit court where investigators failed to disclose 
prior inconsistent statements by confidential informant); Sanders v. State, 374 Ark. 70, 71–
73, 285 S.W.3d 630, 632–33 (2008) (granting leave to file petition for writ of error coram 
nobis in circuit court where evidence showed that the State failed to disclose a deal with 
witness for testimony and did not correct testimony when the witness denied the deal); see 
also Cloird v. State, 349 Ark. 33, 76 S.W.3d 813 (2002); State v. Larimore, 341 Ark. 397, 17 
S.W.3d 87 (2000); Larimore v. State, 327 Ark. 271, 938 S.W.2d 818 (1997). 
 118. In State v. Larimore, the court set out the standard for relief through the remedy of 
coram nobis: 
 
Specifically, we hold that in our review of the granting of a petition for a writ of 
error coram nobis in this case and all future cases we will determine whether 
there is a reasonable probability that the judgment of conviction would not have 
been rendered, or would have been prevented, had the exculpatory evidence been 
disclosed at trial. 
 
341 Ark. at 408, 17 S.W.3d at 94. 
 119. Buckley v. State, No. CR06-172, 2007 WL 1509323, at *4–5 (Ark. May 24, 2007); 
Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 26–27, 238 S.W.3d 24, 31–32 (2006) (appeal from the denial 
of post-conviction relief). 
 120. “Although there is no specific time limit for seeking a writ of error coram nobis, due 
diligence is required in making an application for relief.” Echols v. State, 360 Ark. 332, 338, 
361 Ark. 15, 201 S.W.3d 890, 894 (2005) (citing Echols, 354 Ark. 414, 419, 125 S.W.3d 
153, 157 (2003); Larimore, 327 Ark. at 281–82, 938 S.W.2d at 822–23). In contrast, the time 
limits for filing for post-conviction relief under Rule 37 are sixty days from issuance of the 
appellate court’s mandate in cases appealed, and ninety days from entry of judgment or sen-
tencing if the judgment was not entered within ten days of sentencing if the case was not 
appealed. ARK. R. CRIM. PRO. 37.2(c). For discussion of procedural limitations on coram 
nobis, see J. Thomas Sullivan, Brady-Based Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims, Buckley, and 
the Arkansas Coram Nobis Remedy, 64 ARK. L. REV. 561, 620–27 (2011). 
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Further, the court clearly recognizes the significance of scientific evi-
dence and expert opinion in criminal trials, suggesting that vigorous en-
forcement of disclosure obligations can be expected in the appellate courts. 
That is assuming, of course, that the necessary showing of probable preju-
dice is made in support of the claim of violation. This means, of course, that 
counsel raising the claim in the post-trial process, or during the course of 
trial if a belated disclosure compromises the defense’s theory, must clearly 
articulate a theory of prejudice resulting from the failure to disclose. 
In a notorious case, Dumond v. State,121 the court considered defense 
counsel’s claim that the State failed to disclose fingerprint evidence that a 
police officer mentioned during his testimony.122 Defense counsel moved for 
mistrial, claiming that it had no knowledge of the report in question; the 
prosecutor claimed lack of knowledge.123 After a search for the fingerprint 
report was made at the state crime lab, the lab’s chief latent fingerprint ex-
aminer testified that the prints lifted from the victim’s automobile could not 
be matched due to a lack of points or characteristics.124 Prior to trial, defense 
counsel had moved for disclosure of scientific test results, objecting to the 
prosecutor’s purported reliance on its “open file” policy. The court observed 
that the “open file” policy did not relieve the state of its disclosure burden 
because evidence known to investigators is imputed to the prosecutor.125 The 
prosecution argued that the accused could have conducted his own tests on 
the prints from the car, but the court rejected this argument as dispositive: 
However, the state's argument that appellant could have made his own 
investigation does not suffice. Rather, the defendant is entitled to the op-
portunity, apart from his own investigations, to challenge conclusions 
drawn from tests undertaken by the state. Here, the state could not de-
termine from its tests whether appellant had been in the car. It would be 
as important for the defense preparation to study what the state was go-
ing to present as well as anything the appellant might have prepared. It 
relates not to the right to investigate, but to the effective preparation of a 
defense and rebuttal.126 
. . . . 
Here, appellant made the appropriate request under Rule 17.1 and sought 
the basis of the results of any tests. While the information testified to by 
  
 121. 290 Ark. 595, 721 S.W.2d 663 (1986). 
 122. Id. at 597, 721 S.W.2d at 664.  
 123. Id., 721 S.W.2d at 664. 
 124. Id., 721 S.W.2d at 664. 
 125. Id., 721 S.W.2d at 664. “The ‘open file’ policy has once again proved that it pays to 
hide things you do not want discovered.” Id. at 601, 721 S.W.2d at 667 (Purtle, J., dissent-
ing). 
 126. Id. at 598, 721 S.W.2d at 665 (citing ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(a)(iv)). 
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the expert was neutral and nonprejudicial, appellant was entitled to chal-
lenge the state's conclusion by having his own tests performed.127  
However, the court declined to reverse Dumond’s conviction because 
trial counsel, having made the specific request for disclosure to which he 
was entitled under the rule, failed to properly preserve error in not moving 
for mistrial until after additional testimony had been elicited following the 
officer’s reference to “fingerprint” evidence.128 The court explained its rea-
soning behind declining reversal: 
[A]ppellant's mistrial request was untimely. His objection was that the 
defense was entitled to have the report. There was a recess with no fur-
ther comments by the defense. The expert's testimony ostensibly cured 
the problem as there was no objection before, during or after the finger-
print expert testified and no further discussion of the matter. The appel-
lant must make known to the court the action he wishes the court to take. 
Here the appellant's initial objection and request related only to being en-
titled to see the report and the record shows this was resolved. Appellant 
was given all the relief requested. 
Appellant did not make his objection at the first opportunity, he waited 
until after the testimony of the last witness and the state had rested. The 
defendant cannot wait to see the full strength of the state's case before 
bringing his request to the attention of the trial court.129 
Dumond demonstrates two important points. First, proper preservation 
of error is required in order to establish a discovery violation. The second 
relates to the value to the defense of the disclosure requirement under Rule 
17.1. The fact that the print results were insufficient for identification of the 
assailant likely means that these results would not have constituted exculpa-
tory evidence under Brady. Unless the undisclosed prints would have raised 
a reasonable doubt as to Dumond’s guilt, the disclosure failure would fail to 
support a finding of a due process violation. Assuming other evidence was 
sufficient to establish Dumond’s guilt, the failure to disclose would not have 
warranted relief because the undisclosed fingerprints would not have met 
the Brady standard for exculpatory evidence. 
However, because Rule 17.1(a)(iv) does not limit disclosure of scien-
tific tests or reports of experts to exculpatory material, Dumond was entitled 
to the report. Counsel might have been able to use the report to raise doubt 
about the adequacy of the prosecution’s case, which rested on the rape vic-
  
 127. Dumond, 290 Ark. at 598, 721 S.W.2d at 665. 
 128. Id. at 599, 721 S.W.2d at 665. 
 129. Id., 721 S.W.2d at 665 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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tim’s eyewitness identification.130 The supreme court clearly recognized the 
potential significance of the lack of fingerprint evidence that implicated 
Dumond as a tactical point for the defense. But, as usual, it applied its error 
preservation policy and refused to order relief. It explained that the defense 
defaulted the claim procedurally by delaying its mistrial motion until hear-
ing the prosecution’s entire case, effectively hedging its bets rather than 
complying with the rule requiring contemporary objection to preserve er-
ror.131 
An older example of the court’s recognition of the significance of dis-
covery can be seen in Westbrook v. State.132 In Westbrook, the accused as-
serted an insanity defense and sought access to his medical records by writ-
ten motion. The trial court granted the motion, but the records were not 
made available to counsel.133 Despite repeated requests through subpoena 
duces tecum and a renewed motion for production, the records were never 
provided to the defense.134 The court concluded that the defendant should 
have been given the records: 
  
 130. Id. at 596, 721 S.W.2d at 664. The defense did not raise an evidentiary insufficiency 
challenge on appeal. 
 131. Of course, if mistrial was otherwise warranted by the reference to the fingerprints by 
the officer on the stand, arguably, there would be no justification in demanding that the de-
fendant be forced to seek a termination of the proceedings before assessing the strength of the 
prosecution’s case. In fact, the operation of the rule could, in some cases, lead to a deliberate 
attempt to interject prejudicial error by eliciting inadmissible evidence in order to force the 
accused to move for mistrial when prosecutors conclude that their case has developed into a 
particularly weak one. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976). “[The Double 
Jeopardy Clause] bars retrials where ‘bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor’ threatens the 
‘[h]arassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so as to 
afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict’ the defendant.” Id. (citation 
omitted); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 468 n.3 (1964) (“If there were any intimation 
in a case that prosecutorial or judicial impropriety justifying a mistrial resulted from a fear 
that the jury was likely to acquit the accused, different considerations would, of course, ob-
tain.”). The defendant typically waives double jeopardy protection by moving for mistrial, the 
only exception being in a case in which the prosecution can be shown to have deliberately 
goaded the defense into moving for mistrial. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672, 
674–75 (1982). Arkansas adopted Kennedy in Green v. State, 2011 Ark. 92, 380 S.W.3d 368. 
 132. 265 Ark. 736, 580 S.W.2d 702 (1979). 
 133. Id. at 744–45, 580 S.W.2d at 706–07. 
 134. Id., 580 S.W.2d at 706–07. Not only did the treating physicians fail to produce the 
requested records, the court related this rather amazing fact in the opinion: 
 
On April 14, 1978, appellant's counsel drove to Little Rock and was told by Dr. 
Whitehead that the other records did not exist but he could check at Benton 
where the records were supposed to be kept. Counsel was advised by the Benton 
unit that the records were probably in Little Rock. On this same date Dr. White-
head told counsel that Dr. Buford, the treating physician or psychiatrist for the 
1972 and 1974 commitments of appellant, was no longer there and might be 
dead. In truth, Dr. Buford was still employed as a colleague of Dr. Whitehead. 
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Due to the nature of the defense we feel it was necessary that appellant 
have these records, if they exist, in order to fully prepare his defense. We 
note that Dr. Buford allegedly testified before the same prosecutor and 
trial judge on April 16 or 17, 1978. Even if the prosecuting attorney did 
not have the material requested in his possession, there was no reason 
why more compulsory processes could not have been utilized to obtain 
these vital records. It may be that something in these records would have 
enabled appellant to furnish stronger proof on his behalf.135 
Westbrook, like Dumond, reflects the court’s appreciation for the value 
a scientific test result or expert opinion has for the accused in developing a 
defense, even if the evidence is not wholly exculpatory. 
However, the court is skeptical with regard to the potential use of 
claims that must be adjudicated on the basis of the federal due process dis-
closure duty. For example, in Sanders v. State,136 the defendant sought leave 
to file the petition for writ of error coram nobis in the trial court, arguing 
that he had only recently learned of the exculpatory value of evidence that 
apparently had not been disclosed to the defense prior to trial.137 The evi-
dence involved various articles seized from the crime scene that had been 
lost before they could be subject to scientific testing or evaluation.138 
The court rejected his argument that scientific testing would have dem-
onstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome, particularly in 
light of other evidence supporting conviction. The court rested its conclu-
sion based on the testimony of three witnesses who testified that defendant 
had admitted to the killings and circumstantial evidence that was consistent 
with his guilt on the two counts of capital murder.139 In response to his the-
ory for coram nobis relief, the court found that there was no Brady violation: 
Petitioner offers no documentation or factual substantiation to establish 
that any of the articles even if subjected to extensive forensic testing 
would have had any exculpatory or impeachment value. At best, the test-
ing might have bolstered the defense claim that there was no scientific 
evidence to place him at the scene. This alone, however, does not rise to 
a Brady violation.140 
The court’s disposition reflects that the accused has an even more diffi-
cult burden in raising a due process claim based on the Brady disclosure 
  
 
Id. at 744–45, 580 S.W.2d at 706 (emphasis added). 
 135. Id. at 745, 580 S.W.2d at 707 (emphasis added). 
 136. No. CR 99–628, 2004 WL 2549739 (Ark. Nov. 11, 2004). 
 137. Id. at *1–2.  
 138. Id. at *2. 
 139. Id. (referencing Sanders v. State, 340 Ark. 163, 8 S.W.3d 520 (2000)).  
 140. Id. (emphasis added). 
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duty than in raising a discovery violation arising in the context of Rule 
17.1(a)’s mandatory disclosure duty. The significant problem for defendants 
lies in the fact that unless the undisclosed evidence meets the probable 
prejudice requirements of Brady, relief after the trial process will not be 
available. The coram nobis remedy is phrased in terms of exculpatory evi-
dence under Brady but would not appear to encompass a Rule 17.1(a) dis-
closure violation where the evidence––which might admittedly lead to ex-
culpatory evidence or suggest a viable line for cross-examination––is not 
itself exculpatory or impeaching. 
Although the motion for new trial would logically be a vehicle for pre-
serving error with respect to a claimed violation, Rule 17.1(a) violations are 
typically asserted in the trial, rather than post-trial, process. For instance, in 
Burton v. State,141 defense counsel filed a motion for discovery of items 
covered under the rule. The motion requested the names of the prosecution’s 
witnesses, one of whom was a chemical analyst with the state crime lab, and 
the laboratory report on testing of the suspected controlled substance, co-
caine.142 The prosecution responded by claiming the evidence would be 
available through its “open file” policy, but the information was not located 
in the file.143 The defense complained that the prosecutor failed to engage in 
timely disclosure of the requested information, including the laboratory re-
port, which had become known to the prosecutor.144 The court affirmed the 
defendant’s right to discovery, but held that reversal would be proper only 
upon a showing of prejudice.145 Because the laboratory report was not intro-
duced in evidence, the court held that no prejudice could be shown from the 
discovery failure.146 The court did, however, note that the trial court had the 
authority to exclude evidence not properly disclosed and suggested that al-
ternative remedies, such as permitting defense counsel to interview the un-
disclosed witness, as the trial court ordered, were also available.147 
The problem of demonstrating prejudice to the trial court was undoubt-
edly made more difficult for Burton because he denied that he had neither 
active nor constructive possession of the contraband.148 Consequently, the 
issue of the laboratory report might be seen as a “red herring” because the 
defense was predicated on a theory of complete denial. The court has recog-
nized that in some cases additional testing by defense experts might lead to 
an alternative defensive theory. Additional testing could result in a more 
  
 141. 314 Ark. 317, 862 S.W.2d 252 (1993). 
 142. Id. at 318, 862 S.W.2d at 252–53.  
 143. Id., 862 S.W.2d at 252.  
 144. Id. at 319, 862 S.W.2d at 253. 
 145. Id., 862 S.W.2d at 253.   
 146. Id., 862 S.W.2d at 253. 
 147. Burton, 314 Ark. at 319, 862 S.W.2d at 253. 
 148. Id., 862 S.W.2d at 253. 
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definitive defensive posture if, for example it showed that the substance was 
not cocaine at all. In Burton, however, the trial testimony showed that the 
substance tested was eighty-four percent cocaine base.149 There was no real 
possibility that additional testing would have changed the nature of the 
prosecution’s in the defendant’s favor. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court’s approach to mandatory disclosure, under 
either federal constitutional protections or state court rules, clearly recog-
nizes the potential value of scientific test results and expert opinion reports 
to the defense’s preparation for trial. In assessing the likelihood for relief 
after a disclosure violation, a key factor that suggests the showing of preju-
dice necessary to gain relief is the quality of the scientific or expert evidence 
involved and its potential for negating the guilt of the accused. Two deci-
sions illustrate the significance of the quality of scientific evidence or expert 
opinion. 
In Yates v. State, the court held that the defendant was entitled to dis-
closure of his polygraph test results administered by the police.150 At the 
conclusion of the test, the administering officer had advised Yates that he 
failed the test, and Yates consequently confessed to committing two rapes of 
his twelve-year-old daughter.151 The defense moved to suppress the confes-
sion on the ground that it had been obtained as a result of improper con-
duct.152 After disclosure of his written statement, he filed a supplemental 
motion for disclosure “of the polygraph tapes, in which Officer Beall ques-
tioned Yates, and the questions asked before and after Yates's polygraph 
examination.”153 The State refused to disclose this information and con-
tended that the materials constituted work product.154 
 The issue of disclosure of polygraph test results as a matter of due 
process was considered by the United States Supreme Court in Wood v. Bar-
tholomew in which defendant’s brother testified against him at trial and de-
nied his own involvement in the robberies and multiple homicides.155 The 
brother had, in fact, failed a polygraph test given prior to trial where he also 
had denied involvement in the robbery.156 The Court held that the prosecu-
tor’s failure to disclose these results did not result in a Brady violation be-
  
 149. Id., 862 S.W.2d at 253.  
 150. 303 Ark. 79, 80, 794 S.W.2d 133, 133 (1990). 
 151. Id., 794 S.W.2d at 133. 
 152. Id., 794 S.W.2d at 133.  
 153. Id. at 80–81, 794 S.W.2d at 134. 
 154. Id., 792 S.W.2d 143. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.5 excludes work 
product from the obligatory disclosure duty. Work product is defined under the rule as “re-
search or of records, correspondence, reports or memoranda to the extent that they contain the 
opinions, theories or conclusions of the prosecuting attorney or members of his staff or other 
state agents.” ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.5(a). 
 155. 516 U.S. 1, 4, 6 (1995). 
    156.   Id. 
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cause the polygraph results were inadmissible under state law.157 The Court 
rejected the circuit court’s speculation that the disclosure might have led to 
deposition of the defendant’s brother, which could then have led to admissi-
ble, favorable evidence.158 The majority held that it was “not ‘reasonably 
likely’ that disclosure of the polygraph . . . results would have resulted in a 
different outcome at trial.”159 
The Yates court, however, viewed the polygraph test results as falling 
within the reference to “scientific tests” in Rule 17.1(a)(iv)160 and, regardless 
of the admissibility of the test results at trial, subject to disclosure under the 
rule.161 Moreover, the court noted that use in suppression hearings was the 
primary purpose for obtaining test results and evidence of surrounding cir-
cumstances:162  
Yates specifically advised the trial court that his primary reason for re-
questing the disclosure of the polygraph materials was to impeach Offi-
cer Beall at the suppression hearing. Yates was entitled to the opportu-
nity, apart from his own investigations, to challenge conclusions drawn 
from tests undertaken by the State. The importance of the circumstances 
surrounding the examination, and the validity of its results, cannot be 
minimized in this situation.163 
The court then explained that Yates was prejudiced in his inability to 
fully impeach the officer who performed the test that led to his confession: 
Yates was prejudiced in this case because, from the very beginning of 
trial, it was critical for him to evaluate the circumstances under which his 
polygraph examination was administered and upon which Beall’s con-
clusions were based. The State knew that its case depended primarily 
upon Yates's confession, ostensibly obtained due to the outcome of the 
polygraph examination. Yates's defense was based on destroying Beall’s 
credibility and establishing the involuntariness of his confession. Ques-
tions were raised about the circumstances under which Yates's confes-
sion was obtained; consequently, the trial judge might have ruled differ-
ently in several instances if the truth were known.164 
  
    157.   Id. 
 158. Id. at 6–7. 
 159. Id. at 8. 
 160. Yates, 303 Ark. at 82–83, 794 S.W.2d at 135. 
 161. Id. at 84, 794 S.W.2d at 135–36. 
 162. Id. at 86, 794 S.W.2d at 136.  
 163. Id., 794 S.W.2d at 136–37 (citation omitted). 
 164. Id. at 86–87, 794 S.W.2d at 137 (emphasis added). A defendant is entitled to develop 
evidence of the circumstances surrounding his confession before the jury, even if the confes-
sion has been ruled admissible by the trial court in a pretrial hearing. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 
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The Yates court relied on the state discovery rule and the particularized 
need for the evidence in holding that the polygraph test results and circum-
stances surrounding the test should have been disclosed.165 Because the criti-
cal evidence in the case was the defendant’s confession—which, if sup-
pressed by the trial court, would have left the State’s case in serious doubt—
nondisclosure resulted in prejudice warranting relief. 
Finally, without specifically holding that the disclosure duty necessar-
ily overrules the State’s assertion that evidence sought constitutes work 
product, the Yates majority found that disclosure of the polygraph test was 
implicit in the rule’s reference to “scientific test.”166 But its implicit conclu-
sion rejecting the work product argument was also supported by the circum-
stances by which the evidence was obtained: 
We further point out that, in this case, there was no valid policy reason 
for the State's failure to disclose the polygraph examination results to 
Yates; there was no confidentiality to be protected. Indeed, the State or-
chestrated the examination, Yates participated in the examination, and 
Yates allegedly confessed as a result of being told that he had failed the 
examination.167 
Perhaps oddly, the issue of whether the Brady disclosure duty trumps 
work product as a matter of federal constitutional principle apparently re-
mains unresolved.168 
A second and more direct decision involves claimed suppression of 
DNA evidence that would exclude the defendant.169 In Cloird v. State, the 
defendant sought relief through coram nobis,170 and the court noted the 
compelling nature of his claim: 
In the instant case, petitioner has appended to the petition a laboratory 
report on forensic testing by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
dated July 23, 1992. (Petitioner's trial was held August 24, 1992.) The 
report, which is addressed to a serologist with the Arkansas State Crime 
Laboratory, reflects that the FBI lab received the following items for 
  
U.S. 683 (1986) (holding admissibility of evidence protected by the Sixth Amendment Com-
pulsory Process Clause). 
 165. Id. at 83–84, 794 S.W.2d at 135–36. 
 166. See Yates, 303 Ark. at 83–84, 794 S.W.2d at 135–36. 
 167. Id. at 82–83, 794 S.W.2d at 135. 
 168. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468–70 (1996) (reversing the circuit 
court and holding that the work product doctrine is not overridden by defense’s request for 
evidence necessary to prove a selective prosecution defense). In his concurrence, Justice 
Breyer argued that because Brady is a constitutional-based rule, the disclosure duty overrides 
court-made rules of procedure, including Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Id. at 471 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
 169. Cloird v. State, 349 Ark. 33, 76 S.W.3d 813 (2002). 
 170. Id. at 36–37, 76 S.W.3d at 815. 
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testing: vaginal swabs obtained from the victim, a cutting from the vic-
tim’s jeans, and a cutting from the victim’s underwear. It also received 
samples of the blood of five men, including petitioner, who had been 
identified by the authorities as the persons who sexually assaulted the 
victim. According to the report, DNA comparisons indicated that peti-
tioner was excluded from having contributed to the samples taken from 
the victim. Petitioner contends that he was unable to present the evidence 
earlier because heretofore he had been unable to obtain a copy of the 
DNA test results.171 
The defense’s theory was that there was no scientific evidence support-
ing the prosecution’s claim that Cloird had committed the rape for which he 
was convicted.172 The relief ordered by the court permitted the defendant to 
petition the trial court for relief by writ of error coram nobis. However, in 
ordering the relief, the court directed the trial court to consider whether the 
exculpatory DNA evidence was in the State’s possession prior to trial and, if 
so, whether the evidence was favorable to the defense, thus requiring relief 
from his conviction.173 The court’s reference to the test results demonstrates 
a high probability that Cloird was not the perpetrator, but regardless, it 
clearly supported Clorid’s defensive theory at trial, which was that there was 
no scientific evidence to establish his culpability.174 In fact, it supported his 
theory directly. Thus, the second of the issues almost certainly have to have 
been answered in the affirmative. 
But the first question, which concerns the timing of the test results, pre-
sents an intriguing issue. Assuming that the FBI tested the clothing at the 
request of the investigators or state crime lab, a reasonable conclusion since 
the report was addressed to a serologist at the lab, the FBI arguably became 
a member of the “prosecution team.” Evidence known to the FBI lab in July 
1992 should have been imputed to the prosecution prior to commencement 
of Cloird’s trial the following month.175 Because Brady violations do not 
require proof of bad faith or intentional misconduct on the part of prosecu-
tors who do not disclose exculpatory evidence, this situation certainly sug-
gests that imputed knowledge is consistent with the goals of the rule 
grounded in federal constitutional due process. However, the extent to 
which the principle of imputed knowledge should be extended is not fully 
resolved at this point. 
Yates demonstrates the potential for creative reliance on evidence of a 
scientific nature that can assist the defense in responding to the prosecu-
tion’s theory of the case. Yates also demonstrates that Rule 17.1(a)(iv) con-
  
 171. Id. at 38, 76 S.W.3d at 816. 
 172. Id. at 39, 76 S.W.3d at 816. 
 173. Id., 76 S.W.3d at 816.  
 174. Id., 76 S.W.3d at 816. 
 175. See Cloird, 349 Ark. at 38, 76 S.W.3d at 816. 
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tains rather broad and favorable language that requires disclosure.176 Cloird 
reflects the power of scientific evidence to directly rebut other evidence of 
guilt, including eyewitness testimony and the potential for relief from non-
disclosure.177 These decisions also suggest the potential for well-developed 
arguments advanced in the pre-trial and trial processes for later challenging 
convictions based on disclosure failures. 
V. THE PROBLEM OF REMEDY 
The enforcement of disclosure duties imposed under both Brady and 
Rule 17 is complicated by the fact that successful suppression of evidence 
by state actors serves to frustrate enforcement possibilities under traditional 
remedies. In order to establish a claim that the State has violated Brady, the 
accused has to gain access to the suppressed, undisclosed material. For in-
stance, in Buckley v. State,178 the supreme court denied the motion to reopen 
the case through the writ of coram nobis because the petitioning defendant, 
who had learned of existence of a previously undisclosed videotaped inter-
view with an undercover informant, had been unable to actually obtain the 
tape.179 Although the petitioner requested the supreme court remand the case 
to the trial court to permit counsel to review the taped interview,180 the court 
denied the motion for leave to file the petition.181 
The frustration of Buckley’s coram nobis effort results from the same 
approach to post-trial discovery previously taken by the supreme court with 
respect to Rule 37 actions.182 The court has consistently held that Rule 37 
proceedings could not be used as discovery vehicles for determining the 
  
 176. Yates v. State, 303 Ark. 79, 749 S.W.2d 133 (1990). 
 177. Cloird, 349 Ark. at 38, 76 S.W.3d at 816. 
 178. No. CR 01-644, 2007 WL 2955980 (Ark. Oct. 11, 2007). 
 179. Id. at *4.  
 
Because petitioner cannot show, at this time, that any exculpatory evidence was 
suppressed, he cannot make the required showing that his claim is meritorious. 
Until petitioner can point to specific exculpatory evidence in the videotape, peti-
tioner cannot make a showing as to how the disclosure of any evidence could 
have prevented rendition of the judgment of conviction. We cannot say that he 
has as yet stated facts so as to justify reinvesting jurisdiction in the trial court to 
consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis on this claim. 
 
Id. 
 180. See Buckley v. State, 2010 Ark. 154, at 2, 4, 2010 WL 1255763, at *1–2. 
 181. Id. at 2, 2010 WL 1255763, at *1. 
 182. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37. Rule 37 is the procedural device for raising post-conviction 
challenges to the criminal conviction or sentence imposed by a circuit court. Id. Challenges in 
capital cases in which a death sentence has been imposed are governed by the provisions of 
Rule 37.5; in all other cases, the provisions of Rule 37.1–4 apply. Id. 
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existence of exculpatory evidence that had not been disclosed to the defense. 
Thus, in Weaver v. State183 and Arnold v. State,184 the court rejected the use 
of this post-conviction remedy in attempting to develop evidence supporting 
a Brady/Kyles violation claim. In Weaver, the court explained its reasoning 
for rejecting defendant’s post-conviction claim: 
The list of persons, if any, now sought by Weaver, was available at his 
original trial, but he never sought the information, nor did he claim a 
right to such information on direct appeal. Weaver does not use this post-
conviction proceeding to claim his counsel at trial and on appeal were 
ineffective for failing to obtain the list of names, but instead, he seeks to 
obtain that information in this post-conviction proceeding, saying he is 
entitled to it as exculpatory evidence. Rule 37 does not provide for such 
discovery, and Weaver fails to cite any authority for the proposition. 
Neither does the Rule provide a remedy when an issue could have been 
raised in the trial or argued on appeal.185 
The court’s explanation is clear––where the post-conviction litigant 
does not have supporting evidence to demonstrate the existence of favorable 
evidence, Rule 37 cannot be used simply as a discovery tool.186 Instead, 
counsel’s failure to seek discovery at trial was apparently deemed a failure 
in representation that should have been raised as an ineffective assistance 
claim. Of course, since the disclosure duty is not dependent upon a request 
under either Agurs187 or Rule 17.1(d),188 counsel’s failure to request disclo-
sure of exculpatory evidence would not, itself, necessarily constitute ineffec-
tive assistance since counsel should reasonably be able to expect the prose-
cutor to perform the constitutionally imposed obligation to disclose.189  
Weaver addressed the post-conviction discovery issue in terms of Rule 
37 procedure. The supreme court subsequently clarified its position on en-
forcement of Brady discovery duties in Buckley. The court unequivocally 
required that claims involving prosecutorial misconduct in the suppression 
of favorable evidence be brought in the coram nobis process rather than by 
Rule 37.190 The coram nobis process exists, in most instances, to provide a 
vehicle for reinvesting the trial court with jurisdiction to entertain the peti-
tion alleging the violation of the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory or 
  
 183. 339 Ark. 97, 3 S.W.3d 323 (1999). 
 184. No. CR 03-675, 2004 WL 2066874 (Ark. Sept. 16, 2004). 
 185. Weaver, 339 Ark. at 103, 3 S.W.3d at 328. 
 186. Id., 3 S.W.3d at 328. The court applied similar reasoning in its later unpublished 
opinion in Arnold, 2004 WL 2066874, at *4. 
 187. 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).  
 188. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(d). 
 189. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 276 & nn.13–14 (1999). 
 190. Buckley v. State, 2010 Ark. 154, at 2–3, 2010 WL 1255763, at *1.  
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favorable evidence.191 Because the trial court loses jurisdiction once the case 
is appealed or time for appeal following the conviction has run, the defen-
dant must petition the Arkansas Supreme Court for leave to file the petition 
in the trial court once the supreme court finds that the petition affords a col-
orable basis for relief.192   
Relief is available only when the defendant can show a due process 
violation, using the Brady Court’s formula for relief. The supreme court 
explained this further in Dansby v. State: 
When determining whether a petitioner is entitled to relief as a result of 
material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, the petitioner must dem-
onstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the judgment of con-
viction would not have been rendered, or would have been prevented, 
had the evidence been disclosed at trial.193 
Application of the federal standard requires the petitioning defendant to 
make a sufficient factual showing of a violation that warrants reopening the 
case in the trial court. This requirement appears reasonable, except for the 
underlying problem that the remedy must address—suppression of the fa-
vorable evidence by the prosecutor or law enforcement agents that serve as 
members of the prosecution team. 
Because the evidence has not been disclosed––particularly if the non-
disclosure is deliberate, but even if inadvertent––the petitioner cannot be 
expected to make the required showing unless the suppressed evidence is 
discovered through investigation apart from the disclosure contemplated by 
Rule 17.1. Aside from inadvertent discovery or the defendant’s knowledge 
of the existence of scientific testing that would have produced results subject 
to disclosure under the rule, as in Yates, where the defendant knew that he 
had been given a polygraph examination, the process for determining 
  
 191. Dansby v. State, 343 Ark. 635, 637, 37 S.W.3d 599, 600 (2001).  
 
We have held that a writ of error coram nobis was available to address certain er-
rors of the most fundamental nature that are found in one of four categories: in-
sanity at the time of trial, a coerced guilty plea, material evidence withheld by 
the prosecutor, or a third-party confession to the crime during the time between 
conviction and appeal.   
 
Id., 37 S.W.3d at 601. The first three categories of claims were originally held cognizable in 
coram nobis. Id., 37 S.W.3d at 601. The supreme court expanded the writ to include litigation 
of claims based on a third-party’s confession to the offense for which the defendant had been 
convicted when the issue was raised prior to disposition of the case on direct appeal. Penn v. 
State, 282 Ark. 571, 577, 670 S.W.2d 426, 430 (1984). 
    192.   Dansby, 343 Ark. at 637, 37 S.W.3d at 601.  
 193. Id., 37 S.W.3d at 601. 
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whether there has been a discovery violation is compromised by the fact of 
nondisclosure itself.194 
In fact, the Arkansas decisions involving Rule 17.1(a)(iv)’s require-
ment that scientific test results and expert opinion have typically resulted 
from disclosures of evidence in the State’s possession during pretrial hear-
ings on discovery motions filed by the defense or during trial testimony. 
When violations of the Rule 17.1 disclosure requirement are disclosed prior 
to the conclusion of trial, the defense is in a much more favorable position to 
raise the issue of the violation before the trial court. This permits defense 
counsel to develop a theory of prejudice to the defense resulting from the 
nondisclosure that may be argued on direct appeal in the event of convic-
tion. 
One option may be for the defense to explore the range of evidence 
within the possession of prosecutors or law enforcement agencies relating to 
the case through the use of a Freedom of Information Act request under Ar-
kansas law195 once the case has been concluded196 with conviction, or, by 
acquittal. This approach requires the discovery process to be commenced 
only after the case has been resolved, which effectively deprives the defen-
dant of access to the material subject to mandatory disclosure under Rule 
17.1(a)(iv) for use in developing the defense at trial and deprives defense 
counsel of a complete basis for advising the client in light of all information 
necessary for proper evaluation of the case against his client. Of course, if 
discovery of the disclosure violation occurs within the time for filing a mo-
tion for new trial under the rules, within thirty days following entry of the 
judgment,197 the defense may raise the violation in the motion for relief from 
the judgment.198 
Alternatively, if the disclosure failure under Rule 17.1 also implicates a 
due process violation under Brady because the undisclosed or suppressed 
evidence is either exculpatory or constitutes material impeachment evi-
dence, the Arkansas coram nobis procedure arguably permits, and perhaps 
requires, as a matter of due diligence, that the defendant file for leave to 
petition the trial court to review the claim while the appeal is pending. Thus, 
  
 194. See, e.g., Yates v. State, 303 Ark. 79, 84–87, 794 S.W.2d 133, 136 (1990). 
 195. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to -110 (LEXIS Repl. 2006). Records of criminal 
investigations are “public records” within the meaning of section 25-19-105(a). Martin v. 
Musteen, 303 Ark. 656, 657, 799 S.W.2d 540, 540–41 (1990). 
 196. Records of ongoing investigations are, obviously, excluded from disclosure under 
the Act. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(6) (LEXIS Repl. 2006); see Johninson v. Stodola, 
316 Ark. 423, 425–26, 872 S.W.2d 374, 375 (1994) (explaining that the court should review 
relevant records in camera in order to determine if the ongoing investigation exemption 
should apply). 
 197. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.3(b). 
 198. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.3(a); Halfacre v. State, 265 Ark. 378, 383, 578 S.W.2d 237, 239 
(1979). 
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a post-trial discovery of the suppressed evidence may provide a basis for 
new trial if the evidence is discovered before the time to file the new trial 
motion has passed. If the discovery occurs after the trial court has lost juris-
diction, once notice of appeal has been given,199 and while the case is pend-
ing on direct appeal, Penn v. State200 recognizes that jurisdiction may be 
reinvested in the trial court prior to conclusion of the appeal. 
The coram nobis remedy offers certain advantages over the Rule 37 
post-conviction process for Arkansas defendants. Most importantly, the 
remedy is not controlled by a fixed time limit for filing—sixty days follow-
ing issuance of the mandate on direct appeal, ninety days following entry of 
judgment when the conviction is based on a plea of guilty201—but instead 
requires that the claim be brought forward with due diligence.202 Conse-
quently, the discovery of a disclosure violation, even a lengthy period after 
conviction and the time for post-conviction litigation has run, is still cogni-
zable if the defendant can make the requisite showing to the Arkansas Su-
preme Court to warrant leave for litigation of the claim in the trial court of 
conviction. 
In considering the disclosure duty for scientific evidence and expert 
opinion that would not clearly fit within the Supreme Court’s views of fa-
vorable evidence that must be disclosed to the defense under Brady, the 
question of remedy under Arkansas law is uncertain. The reason is that co-
ram nobis does not provide a remedy for claims that do not directly involve 
prosecutorial misconduct in the suppression or failure to disclose evidence 
subject to mandatory disclosure under the Brady line of Supreme Court de-
cisions. Thus, for instance, in Sanders v. State,203 the supreme court granted 
leave to file the coram nobis petition based on the prosecutors’ failure to 
disclose a deal made with a key witness in the defendant’s capital murder 
prosecution, which resulted in the defendant’s death sentence.204 However, a 
second claim, relating to the witness’s recantation of his trial testimony in-
culpating the defendant, was not cognizable in coram nobis. The court ar-
  
 199. Arkansas Rule of Appellate Criminal Procedure 2(a) provides that notice of appeal 
must be given within thirty days of entry of judgment or denial of relief on a post-trial mo-
tion. 
 200. 282 Ark. 571, 573–74, 670 S.W.2d 426, 427–28 (1984). 
 201. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.2(c). The exception to the filing period for post-conviction 
relief—contained in Rule 37.5(e)—for capital cases in which a death sentence has been im-
posed provides for filing within ninety days of entry of an order issued under Rule 37.5(b)(2). 
Before an order can be issued under Rule 37.5(b)(2), subsection (b)(1)(A) requires a circuit 
court to first conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant under sentence of death 
desires appointment of counsel to represent him or her in a post-conviction challenge to his or 
her conviction or sentence of death. 
 202. Echols v. State, 360 Ark. 332, 338, 201 S.W.3d 890, 894 (2005). 
 203. 374 Ark. 70, 285 S.W.3d 630 (2008). 
 204. Id. at 72–73, 285 S.W.3d. at 633. 
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rived at this conclusion 205 despite the fact that it arose from the same factual 
scenario and both claims reflected the witness’s dishonesty. Nevertheless, 
the recantation would clearly be relevant to the question of the potential 
prejudice to the accused resulting from the failure of the prosecutor to dis-
close the agreement and the witness’s uncorrected denial that he was testify-
ing because of the deal. Sanders suggests that a violation of Rule 17.1(a)(iv) 
in suppression of scientific test results or expert opinion that does not 
amount to nondisclosure of evidence favorable to the accused is not cogni-
zable in coram nobis. 
If the coram nobis remedy is not available for a discovery failure by the 
prosecuting attorney because the scientific evidence or expert opinion does 
not constitute exculpatory evidence or material impeachment, enforcement 
of the disclosure duty would appear dependent upon the timing of the even-
tual discovery of the previously undisclosed evidence. Discovery during 
trial would appear to afford the defendant the best possibility for a remedy 
for the violation. First, trial counsel would be in a position to explain pre-
cisely why the nondisclosure has prejudiced the defense in its trial prepara-
tion. Second, it would afford the trial court, in an appropriate case, an oppor-
tunity to order relief during the proceedings, such as by granting a continu-
ance to permit the defense to use the newly-discovered evidence in either 
presenting its defense or in responding to the State’s theory of the case.  
However, in some cases, the failure to disclose the evidence prior to 
trial might preclude a reasonable opportunity for the defense to address the 
State’s case in light of the undisclosed evidence. Moreover, if the sup-
pressed evidence is at the heart of the prosecution’s case, the failure to dis-
close prior to trial would most likely prevent the defense from properly pre-
paring a defense, violating either the defendant’s confrontation or compul-
sory process rights under the Sixth Amendment.206 It also compromises 
counsel’s effectiveness in representing the accused because counsel does not 
have information necessary to properly advise the defendant with respect to 
alternatives in proceeding to trial or waiving trial and entering a plea of 
guilty, accepting a plea offer, or in formulating the most credible theory of 
defense when the accused decides to proceed to trial.207 Where this is argu-
  
 205. Id. at 73, 285 S.W.3d at 633. 
 206. The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, “In all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel 
for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.   
 207. Id. An ineffective defense theory might be predicated on the fact that the State’s 
misconduct in failing to disclose evidence prevents defense counsel from properly evaluating 
the case and, thus, advising the client according to counsel’s best professional judgment. By 
analogy, in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), for instance, a state procedural rule 
requiring the defendant to testify first on his own behalf compromised counsel’s ability to 
properly advise the client about the wisdom of testifying by forcing the defendant to make the 
 
2013] DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE 289 
able, of course, the nondisclosure results in a federal constitutional violation 
subject to challenge in the trial and direct appeal process. 
If the nondisclosure fails to provide a basis for arguing actual prejudice 
to the defendant in the preparation of the defense or decision-making regard-
ing the defendant’s exercise of the jury trial right, it is probable that lack of 
prejudice will prove controlling on appeal.208 Typically, reversal is predi-
cated on injury to the party’s right to a fair trial209 unless the error is one of 
such structural significance that harm and harmlessness cannot be deter-
mined from the record.210 Arguably, in the proper circumstance, nondisclo-
sure may well so compromise the defendant’s ability to offer a credible de-
fense at trial as to require relief. The nondisclosure could result in surprise 
in the presentation of evidence not fairly anticipated by the defense. Or, it 
could prejudice the accused due to the suppression of evidence that would 
have afforded the defense a viable alternative theory or approach to address-
ing the State’s case. Thus, even though the undisclosed evidence would not, 
itself, be subject to constitutional disclosure as exculpatory or material im-
peachment evidence under Brady and Bagley respectively, the State’s failure 
to disclose evidence required by Rule 17.1 might still require relief in the 
form of mistrial or reversal on appeal.211 
The safest course of action for defense counsel confronted by a prose-
cutor’s case resting in whole or in part on scientific evidence will actually 
lie in filing a formal motion for discovery that specifically requests the dis-
closure of all scientific test results or expert opinion obtained by the prose-
cutor, investigators, or members of the prosecution team. Requiring the 
State to respond––on the record or, preferably, in open court––that no addi-
  
decision to testify or remain silent before other defense witnesses have testified. Because 
counsel is unable to advise the defendant in light of the strength of testimony of other defense 
witnesses before advising the client, the rule created a structural barrier to the exercise of the 
best professional judgment by the defense lawyer. 
 208. E.g., Larimore v. State, 317 Ark. 111, 121, 877 S.W.2d 570, 575 (1994) (“Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling admitting evidence unless a substantial right is affected, and 
we will not reverse in the absence of prejudice.”). 
 209. Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure Criminal 15 provides, in pertinent part, “A 
conviction shall be reversed and a new trial ordered where the Supreme Court finds that the 
conviction is contrary to the Constitution or the laws of Arkansas, or for any reason deter-
mines that the appellant did not have a fair trial.” ARK. R. CRIM. P. 15 (emphasis added). 
 210. See, e.g., Teater v. State, 89 Ark. App. 215, 221–23, 201 S.W.3d 442, 446–47 (2005) 
(explaining that the doctrine of structural error requires reversal when error is not capable of 
being analyzed for prejudice in terms of the totality of the trial record such that the reviewing 
court would be required to speculate on the impact of error on the proceedings). 
 211. Id. at 221–23, 201 S.W.3d at 446–47. Reversal might be required as a matter of 
structural error where the disclosure violation cannot be evaluated in terms of potential preju-
dice to the accused without speculation by the appellate court with respect to the potential 
impact that disclosure might have had in terms of the jury’s assessment of the case. Id., 201 
S.W.3d at 446–47.  
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tional material subject to the mandatory disclosure requirement of Rule 17.1 
exists will serve to preserve the claimed violation. But, defense counsel 
should also be able to offer a reasonable argument that the undisclosed evi-
dence would have proved favorable to the defense at trial, would have aided 
counsel an in advising the client, or in preparing a different defensive strat-
egy for use at trial. This will often require considerable creative thinking on 
the part of defense counsel, but like many other aspects of criminal defense, 
it may be necessary to protect the client’s right to a fair trial or to ensure that 
a client knowingly and intelligently waives a jury or enters a plea of guilty. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Application of federal constitutional and state procedural rules regard-
ing disclosure to matters of scientific evidence, test results, or expert opinion 
is particularly important because this type of evidence often provides a criti-
cal structure in the prosecution’s theory of the case. Unlike cases resting on 
eyewitness testimony, confessions, or other inculpatory statements, the 
State’s reliance on scientific evidence suggests reliance on objectively 
proved grounds for concluding that the defendant has committed the offense 
charged rather than on questionable testimony, bias, or other reliability fac-
tors. As a consequence, contradictory conclusions or test results are particu-
larly significant for either excluding the accused’s guilt altogether or raising 
a reasonable doubt about the prosecution’s theory as to the way in which the 
offense occurred or the reliability of its conclusion that the accused commit-
ted the crime. 
The recent history of DNA has advanced the role of science in criminal 
trials and serves to demonstrate the power of scientific evidence as exculpa-
tory in nature. Unlike impeachment evidence, subject to disclosure under 
Bagley,212 scientific evidence and expert opinion testimony possess an in-
herently powerful potential for negating guilt directly, rather than simply 
serving to undermine the credibility of prosecution’s witnesses. The ultimate 
success of Brady-based disclosure, however, remains in the willingness of 
appellate courts to entertain arguments focusing on the necessary elements 
for proof of violations––particularly proof of prejudice. The quality of those 
arguments is, of course, dependent on the skill with which they are made in 
light of controlling principles and procedural rules.213 
 
  
 212. Bagley was recognized as compelling disclosure of impeachment evidence in Yates. 
Yates v. State, 303 Ark. 79, 86, 794 S.W.2d 79, 136 (1990). 
 213. Typically, this is directed at the skill of counsel, but the opinion in Cloird reflects 
that the petitioner brought his claim pro se. Cloird v. State, 349 Ark. 33, 36, 76 S.W.3d 813, 
816 (2002); see supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text.  
